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ABSTRACT 
 
Through an inductive, qualitative study of individuals developing new artificial 
intelligence (AI) technologies, this dissertation builds theory on how creative workers manage 
the emotions that arise from forecasting the outcomes of implementing their creations. I find that, 
in a context that illuminates the danger of implementing certain types of creative ideas, creative 
workers forecast both positive and negative outcomes arising from implementing their work, 
which elicits ambivalence. My work indicates that how creative workers respond to this 
ambivalence affects whether they impose constraints on their work as it unfolds. First, some 
individuals may proceed without constraints because they have resolved their ambivalence by 
amplifying their positive thoughts and feelings toward their work. Informants who exhibited this 
pattern created psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & Liberman, 2003) from the 
potential negative effects of their work by anchoring on the present moment and/or emphasizing 
potential positive outcomes. However, the majority of informants exhibited a novel 
“redistribution” response to ambivalence, whereby they committed to their work (Brickman et 
al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011) and shifted from a strengthening of 
negative thoughts and feelings toward a strengthening of positive thoughts and feelings through 
the use of self-imposed constraints. My work suggests that, although self-imposed constraints do 
not eliminate negative thoughts and feelings altogether, applying these self-determined 
boundaries enables individuals to reduce ambivalence and engage (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 
2002) more fully in their work. In addition to inducing a process model that encompasses these 
dynamics, I present the categories and types of self-imposed constraints that I have induced. 
These self-imposed constraints are not mutually exclusive, and each serves one of three broader 
purposes: developing a sense that one’s creation will have a positive moral valence, that one will 
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be able to control his or her creation, or that one may trust in the quality of his or her creation. 
This dissertation extends theory on the role of prospective thought processes in creative work 
and shows how constraints, though often seen as impediments to creativity, can be used 
proactively by creative workers to manage the darker emotions and thought processes that have 
largely been overlooked in prior research. This work also contributes a novel response to 
ambivalence, redistribution, which entails approaching potentially harmful creative work in a 
heedful manner. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
So much of the community is in a phase of just getting these things to work, that 
we’re just starting to address the problem of, “Well, what if they work too well?” 
And, “Even if they work perfectly well, what do we use them for?” And I think 
you’ve caught me at a time where I am not entirely sure about that, and I’m 
thinking about it a lot. [Harry] 
 
Creativity, defined as the production of novel and useful ideas or products (Amabile, 
1983, 1988; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Stein, 1974), is 
part of what makes us human and enables us to flourish. But inherent in the definition of 
creativity, specifically the notion of novelty, is the possibility that negative outcomes may arise 
when introducing a creative product to the world. It is impossible to know ahead of time all of 
the unintended and possibly negative effects that might result from implementing a creative idea. 
To illustrate, McDonald’s revolutionized the food industry by providing consumers with 
convenient and inexpensive meals, leading many other fast food franchises to follow suit – and 
driving the ongoing obesity epidemic (e.g., Bowman & Vinyard, 2004; Pereira, Kartashov, 
Ebbeling, Van Horn, Slattery, Jacobs, & Ludwig, 2005). As another example, the invention of 
the smartphone equipped people with pocket-sized computers, enabling the near-constant 
accessibility of information and social connections – and initiating a smartphone addiction crisis 
(Demirci, Akgönül, & Akpinar, 2015). As a final example, e-cigarettes replace tobacco with 
electronically heated nicotine, helping smokers to quit (Hajek et al., 2019) – and sparking 
nicotine addiction and a potentially fatal lung illness among younger generations (Tolentino, 
2018; Abbott, 2019). Creative inventions have the potential to effect significant change when 
they are implemented, but positive outcomes may be accompanied by adverse effects, and some 
ideas may eventually do more harm than good. 
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Research has held that creativity relies on being able to explore ideas freely rather than 
being overly attuned to outcomes (e.g., Amabile, 1979). However, the uncertainty inherent in 
implementing truly novel creations likely compels individuals to forecast the downstream effects 
that could arise from implementing their ideas.1 Some research has begun to explore the 
prospective thought process of creative forecasting, which is defined as predicting the outcomes 
of new ideas (Kettner, Guilford, & Christensen, 1959; Wilson, Guilford, Christensen, & Lewis, 
1954; Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010; Berg, 2016). This work has assessed individuals’ 
accuracy in predicting whether an idea is likely to succeed (e.g., Mumford, Lonergan, & Scott, 
2002; Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010; Berg, 2016) and explored how individuals may revise 
their ideas based on forecasting whether they will meet implementation criteria (e.g., Lonergan, 
Scott, & Mumford, 2004). However, extant research largely neglects the forecasting that creative 
workers may do regarding what may happen after an idea becomes highly successful. Indeed, the 
more widely adopted an idea, the greater its potential to do harm, should unintended 
consequences arise.  
Because creativity involves developing ideas that challenge existing norms (Brockhaus, 
1980; Janssen & Van Yperen, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Amabile, 1983, 1988; 
Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Zhou & 
George, 2001; Perry-Smith, 2006; Simmons & Ren, 2009), implementing creative ideas may 
bring about unintended – and perhaps dangerous – outcomes. Some creative ideas, such as 
complex, new technologies, have a heightened potential for harmful effects on large numbers of 
people due to their potential scope of impact and the ways that they are integrated into people’s 
 
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use phrases like “positive and negative effects,” “potential outcomes”, “distal 
outcomes,” “forecasted outcomes,” “potential consequences,” “potential adverse effects,” and “downstream effects” 
to refer to the outcomes that follow the implementation of creative ideas. 
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lives (Jasper, 2010). I refer to this as “potentially harmful creativity.” With growing discussion 
of the likelihood of adverse downstream effects on the general public, the domain of artificial 
intelligence (AI) development, which involves computer systems that rival or surpass human 
intelligence in their capabilities, exemplifies these dynamics. Under such circumstances, the 
creative workers developing the new technologies may grapple with the negative outcomes that 
could follow the implementation of their creations. This dissertation examines this tension, 
exploring how creative workers may persist despite the potential dangers posed by implementing 
their ideas. 
One might think that individuals simply would not engage in potentially harmful 
creativity, yet retrospective accounts (e.g., Bethe, 1968; Feynman, 2005) indicate that individuals 
do indeed pursue creative ideas even when there may be negative effects on others (Hecht, 2010; 
Zaitseva, 2010; Cropley, 2010). Hecht (2010) speculates that the scientists involved in 
developing nuclear technology, for example, willfully blinded themselves to the possible 
consequences of their work. However, there is a paucity of research examining potentially 
harmful creativity as it unfolds, and in particular, the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral 
reactions that may be elicited by forecasting downstream effects. Considering downstream 
effects may impact the decisions that creative workers make during the creative process by 
evoking emotional reactions that influence thinking and behavior. For instance, sensing that one 
is negatively affecting other people can give rise to guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
Heatherton, 1994), and expecting negative outcomes is associated with emotions and thought 
processes that drive more cautious behavior (e.g., Sitkin & Weingart, 1995). At the same time, 
creativity depends on how individuals feel (e.g., positive affect, Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & 
Staw, 2005), think (e.g., creativity-relevant processes, Amabile, 1983, 1988, 1996; Amabile & 
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Pratt, 2016), and act (e.g., challenging the status quo, Zhou & George, 2003). However, 
forecasting potential downstream effects has largely been overlooked in models seeking to 
explain key influences on creative outcomes (e.g., Amabile & Pratt, 2016; see Lubart, 2001, for a 
review).  
This absence is likely an artifact of several factors. First, there is a longstanding divide 
between creativity and innovation research. Creativity research primarily focuses on the initial 
generation of creative ideas and products, while research on innovation, defined as the 
implementation of creative ideas at the organization or field level, generally focuses on these 
“macro-level” dynamics (Amabile, 1988; West & Farr, 1990; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Hennessey 
& Amabile, 2010; George, 2007; Mumford et al., 2002; Byrne et al., 2010). In reality, this split is 
somewhat artificial; creative workers often do think about whether their ideas will be 
implemented (e.g., Berg, 2016). Second, and related to the divide between creativity and 
innovation research, creativity is often studied through laboratory experiments (Hennessey & 
Amabile, 2010; Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Oldham & 
Cummings, 1996), which by nature rely on short-term, finite tasks. Such tasks enable the precise 
evaluation of causal influences on creative outcomes, but they typically preclude examining 
factors associated with implementation, even though considerations regarding the consequences 
of implementation may play an important role in the creative process.  
Third, because creativity and innovation are frequently assumed to be inherently 
beneficial for society (James, Clark, & Cropanzano, 1999; James & Taylor, 2010, Runco, 2010), 
extant research has not taken seriously the notion that creative ideas can be dangerous 
(Anderson, Potočnik, & Zhou, 2014). Prior research on potentially harmful creativity is quite 
limited and highly speculative. It relies primarily on descriptive, retrospective accounts, such as 
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those of the scientists who developed nuclear technology or who participated in the Soviet 
Union’s program for developing weapons of mass destruction (e.g., Bethe, 1968; Zaitseva, 
2010). Cropley (2010) posits that despite having good intentions, individuals engaging in 
potentially harmful creativity may be unable or unwilling to consider the potential consequences 
of their work, whether because of their own intrinsic enjoyment or because of external coercion. 
Whether either of these explanations (among others) is accurate remains in question, though, due 
to the reliance on retrospective accounts. Such accounts are colored by hindsight bias (Roese & 
Vohs, 2012) and therefore neglect important sensemaking processes that occur along the way to 
realizing creative outcomes (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999). Indeed, creative workers must 
navigate the potential outcomes of implementing their ideas in the moment, when the novelty of 
the emerging idea occludes the exact nature of possible outcomes, even though they may be 
broadly aware that downsides will likely exist. This is a significant distinction, because post hoc 
justifications differ from in-the-moment reasoning due to the innate equivocality and emotional 
charge of in-the-moment interpretations and judgments (March, 1994; Weick, 1979, 1995; 
Hogarth, Portell, & Cuxart, 2007; Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev, 2011). 
These shortcomings create an opportunity to extend the understanding of the role of 
prospective thought processes in creative work by exploring whether and how forecasting distal 
outcomes elicits emotional reactions and influences how creative workers approach their work in 
the present. Because of the greater likelihood of adverse effects on others, engaging in 
potentially harmful creativity may elicit particularly strong emotional reactions as individuals 
consider the possible outcomes of their work. Though seeing the positive potential of a creation 
may drive excitement and enjoyment (Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1992; Andersson, 1996), 
forecasting negative effects may engender concern and guilt (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & 
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Heatherton, 1994), which may change how creative workers approach their work. Another 
possibility is that positive and negative outcomes may seem equally likely, which could be 
associated with emotional ambivalence (positive and negative feelings, e.g., Pratt & Doucet, 
2000; Fong, 2006; Fong & Tiedens, 2002; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Williams & 
Aaker, 2002; Rothman & Wiesenfeld, 2007).  
With this dissertation, I examine the following research questions regarding forecasting 
and emotions in the creative process: 
Research Question 1a: How, if at all, do creative workers forecast the outcomes 
of implementing their potentially harmful creations? 
Research Question 1b: What emotional experiences, if any, arise during this 
forecasting process? 
 
In addition to unpacking the relationship between creative forecasting and the emotions it 
engenders, I also investigate whether and how this influences the creative process: 
Research Question 2: How, if at all, does forecasting the outcomes of 
implementing potentially harmful creations influence the creative process? 
 
The growing domain of artificial intelligence (AI), which involves computer systems that 
rival or surpass human intelligence in their capabilities, offers a fruitful context to explore these 
dynamics with inductive, qualitative methods. With AI, the nature of what is created greatly 
amplifies the potential for adverse effects on a large number of people. Though AI may solve 
many of society’s problems, from biased decision making to car accidents to disease (e.g., Vyas, 
2018; Tegmark, 2019), AI promises to displace many human workers, and it threatens societal 
norms and even human safety, if not properly applied (Tegmark, 2019). Given the threats to the 
general public posed by AI development and implementation, these dynamics create a rich 
context to explore how creative workers forecast the outcomes of implementing their work, the 
emotions that arise, and how these factors influence the creative process.  
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I employ inductive, qualitative methods to address my research questions. To preview my 
findings, my work indicates that, in the context of potentially harmful creativity, creative 
workers forecast both positive and negative outcomes of implementing their work, which elicits 
ambivalence. How individuals respond to this ambivalence seems to affect whether they impose 
constraints on their work as it unfolds. One group of informants amplified their positive thoughts 
and feelings toward their work and proceeded without constraints. These informants created 
psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & Liberman, 2003) from the potential negative 
effects of their work by anchoring on the present moment and/or emphasizing the relative 
importance of potential positive outcomes. They thereby rendered potential negative outcomes 
irrelevant to their work and did not constrain their work. However, the majority of informants 
exhibited a novel “redistribution” response to ambivalence, whereby they committed to their 
work (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011) but shifted from a 
temporary intensification of negative thoughts and feelings toward a strengthening of positive 
thoughts and feelings through the use of self-imposed constraints. My work suggests that, 
although self-imposed constraints do not eliminate negative thoughts and feelings altogether, 
applying these self-determined boundaries enables individuals to take responsibility for potential 
negative outcomes and quell fears about the future of their creations. This process ultimately 
seems to enable them to engage (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002) more fully in their work.  
This dissertation makes important contributions to theory on forecasting, emotions, and 
constraints in creative work. Although the creative process is often suffused with positive 
emotion (e.g., Isen, 2000; Isen & Reeve, 2005; Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; 
Amabile & Kramer, 2011), and creativity itself is lauded as a benefit to society (James, Clark, & 
Cropanzano, 1999; James & Taylor, 2010), creative workers still have to grapple with 
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complicated and often negative thoughts and emotions about what their creations could become. 
I show how, in potentially harmful creative work, ambivalence accompanies forecasting distal 
outcomes. I reveal how different responses to ambivalence inform the creative process and may 
reshape its outcomes, depending on whether individuals impose constraints on their work and the 
types of constraints that they use. This dissertation also helps build a bridge between research on 
creativity and innovation by showing how prospective thought processes regarding 
implementation, typically a concern of innovation, may influence the choices that individuals 
make during the creative process. Additionally, this work answers the recent call for 
organizational scholars to examine AI development in particular – specifically, how individuals 
developing new AI technologies think about the downstream effects of their work and how these 
considerations affect the decisions that they make in the present (Amabile, 2019). 
Prior work on creativity and emotions has focused largely on emotions as an input into 
the creative process, showing how positive affect seems to be a consistent driver of creativity 
(see Hennessey & Amabile, 2010, and Amabile & Pratt, 2016), while negative affect may 
contribute to creative performance under particular circumstances (e.g., George & Zhou, 2002; 
George & Zhou, 2007). Rather than viewing emotions as an input into the creative process or 
focusing on emotions of one valence, I show how mixed emotions may emerge during the 
creative process, when individuals forecast both positive and negative outcomes of implementing 
their work, which seems to influence their work directly. 
I also build theory by showing how constraints (e.g., Rosso, 2014; Amabile & Gitomer, 
1984) can be used to help creative workers manage the darker thoughts and emotions that have 
largely been overlooked in prior research seeking to explain the creative process (e.g., Amabile 
& Pratt, 2016; see Lubart, 2001, for a review). To my knowledge, prior research on constraints 
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has focused exclusively on external constraints and has often shown how they inhibit creativity 
(e.g., Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Amabile, 1983, 1988, 1996), though some work has 
indicated that certain types of external constraints may benefit idea generation (e.g., Finke, 
1990). I offer a different perspective, revealing how constraints may be used proactively (i.e., 
self-imposed) by creative workers to manage the cognitive and emotional challenges posed by 
engaging in potentially harmful creativity. 
From a managerial perspective, this work sheds light on how organizations might best 
manage potentially harmful creativity. This project reveals that in the absence of field-level 
norms and ethical guidelines to guide behavior, individuals working on potentially harmful 
creative endeavors respond differently to the ambivalence that arises from forecasting the 
outcomes of implementing their work, and these differences appear to influence whether they 
choose to constrain their own creativity. Organizations involved in potentially harmful creativity 
should recognize, first of all, that ambivalence is likely prevalent among employees, and how 
individuals respond may reshape the creative process as well as the ideas that they develop. 
Organizations should work to understand employees’ emotional experiences and determine 
whether their constraint decisions align with organizational goals. Further, this dissertation 
contributes to an emerging discussion on the consequences of unconstrained creativity, whether 
for individuals’ personal lives (e.g., Harrison & Wagner, 2016) or for society at large (Cropley, 
2010). I demonstrate how self-imposed constraints may help individuals to engage heedfully in 
potentially harmful creative work.  
Chapter 2 presents the literature review for this dissertation, focusing on creativity and 
the risk of harmful outcomes, forecasting, and emotions. Chapter 3 details the inductive, 
qualitative methodological approach and rationale for the study. Chapter 4 presents the findings, 
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including the induced process model illustrating forecasting, ambivalence responses, and the role 
of constraints in the creative process, as well as the induced categorization of the different types 
of constraints that informants imposed on their work. Finally, in Chapter 5, the dissertation 
closes with a discussion of theoretical contributions to creativity research and areas for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2: 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Creativity, defined as the production of novel and useful ideas or products (Amabile, 
1983, 1988; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Stein, 1974), is 
often assumed to be a purely positive force (Runco, 2010; James, Clark, & Cropanzano, 1999; 
James & Taylor, 2010; Anderson, Potočnik, & Zhou, 2014). However, novelty carries the risk of 
unintended – and possibly negative – outcomes. Particularly when creativity is potentially 
harmful, defined as having the potential to adversely affect a large number of people through 
implementation (application of idea at organization or field level; Amabile, 1988; West & Farr, 
1990), workers may grapple with the possible outcomes of implementing their work. This may 
give rise to emotions that influence the creative process as it unfolds. However, existing models 
of the creative process (e.g., Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; see Lubart, 2001, for 
a review) largely assume that creative workers strive for successful and impactful ideas, 
overlooking how forecasting downstream effects may elicit complicated and possibly negative 
emotions. As such, existing models neglect a potentially significant influence on the process by 
which individuals develop their ideas. 
In the sections that follow, I review relevant research on creativity and the risk of harmful 
outcomes, creative forecasting, and emotions. I argue that the process of forecasting distal 
outcomes during potentially harmful creative endeavors demands further scholarly attention. 
Creativity, risk, and the potential for harm. Creativity involves taking the risk of 
proposing a new idea: By definition, ideas are only creative if they are novel (Amabile, 1983, 
1988; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Stein, 1974). A large 
body of work relates creativity to being willing to push boundaries and pursue ideas that break 
with existing norms (Brockhaus, 1980; Janssen & Van Yperen, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 
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1979; Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Mumford & Gustafson, 1988; Shalley, 
Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Zhou & George, 2001; Perry-Smith, 2006; Simmons & Ren, 2009).  
Because creativity inherently entails exploring new frontiers, either incrementally or more 
radically (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988), strategies for fostering creativity typically involve 
questioning the status quo, breaking rules, and taking risks (Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 
2008). Indeed, risk aversion has a negative effect on creativity (Friedman & Förster, 2001) 
because focusing on risks prevents individuals from considering more novel responses.  
Embedded in the notion of novelty, however, is the risk of unintended and possibly 
negative outcomes. Further, some types of creative ideas have a particularly wide scope of 
impact associated with their implementation – and a heightened potential to adversely affect 
large numbers of people. I refer to this as “potentially harmful creativity.” This potential for 
widespread harm is especially pronounced in fields that involve the development of complex 
new technologies (Jasper, 2010), such as nuclear technology, gene editing, and artificial 
intelligence (AI; computer systems that rival or surpass human intelligence). Nonetheless, 
precisely because of the potential scope of impact, such creativity may also offer great benefits 
(e.g., Hecht, 2010). As an example, the same creative ideas that led to the development of 
nuclear bombs, which killed an estimated 246,000 people in Japan at the end of World War II, 
also enabled the creation of nuclear energy, which has saved an estimated 1.84 million lives by 
reducing carbon pollution (Kharecha & Hansen, 2013).  
Although we know that creative workers must be able to take risks in terms of pursuing 
novel ideas and that certain types of ideas have a heightened potential for harmful outcomes, we 
know relatively little about how creative workers actually forecast the distal risks associated with 
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the implementation of their ideas. The absence of research on how creative workers forecast the 
potential outcomes of implementation is likely due to several factors.  
First, there is a longstanding split between the creativity and innovation literatures, with 
creativity research focusing on individual or group idea generation and innovation research 
focusing on the macro-level dynamics of innovation, defined as the implementation of new ideas 
at the organization or field level (Amabile, 1988; West & Farr, 1990; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; 
Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; George, 2007). Embedded in this divide is the assumption that 
creative workers do not concern themselves very much with implementation (see Creative 
forecasting section below for exceptions). Second, experimental research, which makes up the 
bulk of creativity research (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Elsbach & Kramer, 2003; Drazin, 
Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Oldham & Cummings, 1996), typically relies on short-term, finite 
tasks. While some laboratory experiments have asked individuals to envision particular 
implementations of their ideas (e.g., Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 2004; Byrne, Shipman, & 
Mumford, 2010), it is unclear whether conclusions based on such designs would hold if 
individuals are truly invested in the outcomes of implementation, as they typically are in 
organizational settings.  
A third issue is the frequent – and often untested – assumption that creativity and 
innovation are purely positive forces. The potential dangers of developing and implementing 
certain types of creative ideas are generally overlooked (Anderson, Potočnik, & Zhou, 2014). To 
my knowledge, the only scholarly work that has attempted to shed light on the dynamics of 
potentially harmful creativity consists of post-hoc analyses of retrospective accounts (e.g., Bethe, 
1968). As an example, by analyzing retrospective reports from the scientists who developed 
nuclear technology, scholars have posited that scientists proceeded despite the risk of significant 
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adverse effects due to an intentional blindness to possible negative consequences (Hecht, 2010), 
a “fascination or unquestioning belief in what they [were] doing” (Cropley, 2010: 360), or 
simply “complacency or hubris” (Jasper, 2010: 111). Retrospective accounts from others 
involved (e.g., Feynman, 2005) introduce the possibility that at least some of the scientists 
believed that dangerous consequences were likely but proceeded because they reasoned that it 
would be more dangerous not to make advancements. As another example, based on post-hoc 
and often secondary accounts (e.g., Wheelis, Rózsa, & Dando, 2006) derived from a number of 
sources, Zaitseva (2010) argues that the scientists who developed biological weapons for the 
Soviet Union were motivated by prestige, the ability to participate in creative work with 
unrestricted resources, and the desire to protect their home country.  
Of course, retrospective accounts differ significantly from in-the-moment descriptions. 
In-the-moment reasoning is by nature more equivocal and uncertain (March, 1994; Weick, 1979, 
1995; Sonenshein, 2007). Retrospective accounts are subject to hindsight bias, which leads 
individuals to act as though previous events were expected, when in reality, they could not have 
been predicted (Roese & Vohs, 2012). This “creeping determinism” (Nestler, Blank, & von 
Collani, 2008: 182) often prevents individuals from accounting for in-the-moment thought 
processes and actions after the fact. In-the-moment perceptions also tend to be more emotionally 
charged than retrospective accounts of the same issues (Hogarth, Portell, & Cuxart, 2007; 
Hogarth, Portell, Cuxart, & Kolev, 2011), and given that emotions serve as a source of 
information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz, 2011), 
the dulled emotions of retrospective accounts (e.g., Aaker, Drolet, & Griffin, 2008) may not 
adequately explain in-the-moment decisions. Conclusions based on retrospective accounts are 
therefore speculative and potentially incorrect. It is critical to understand the prospective thought 
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processes that inform creativity as it unfolds, before potential hazards become concrete outcomes 
and before in-the-moment interpretations are replaced by retrospective justifications. 
Below, I discuss existing research on creative forecasting before arguing that the paucity 
of research in this area demands further scholarly attention due to how the outcomes of 
forecasting may influence the creative process.  
Creative forecasting. Creative forecasting is defined as predicting the outcomes of new 
ideas within particular settings (Kettner, Guilford, & Christensen, 1959; Wilson, Guilford, 
Christensen, & Lewis, 1954; Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010; Berg, 2016). Forecasting has 
been conceptualized as part of the “late cycle process” (Byrne et al., 2010: 119) of idea 
evaluation, during which individuals appraise their ideas based on a particular set of standards 
(Mumford, Lonergan, & Scott, 2002; Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 2004). To delineate how 
creative forecasting fits into predominate stage models of the individual creative process (e.g., 
Wallas, 1926; Hogarth, 1980; Nystrom, 1979; Amabile, 1983, 1988), I begin by describing the 
stages that appear in most existing models and situate forecasting within the idea evaluation 
stage.  
Situating creative forecasting in the creative process. Creativity begins with the task 
presentation stage (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016), sometimes called problem or 
task identification (Lubart, 2001), which is followed by preparation (Amabile, 1983, 1988; 
Amabile & Pratt, 2016), during which relevant resources are gathered. This may be accompanied 
by an incubation period (Gardner, 1993; Gruber & Davis, 1995; Mainemelis, 2010). Idea 
(response) generation follows, during which creative workers generate a number of possible 
solutions for the task at hand (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Lubart, 2001; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). The 
early stages of the creative process focus heavily on divergent thinking (Guilford, 1967, 1968, 
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1982), which involves making associations between diverse concepts and searching for original 
ideas. In the later stages, individuals utilize more convergent thinking, relying on experience and 
expertise to narrow down the search and focus on achieving creative success with a single, more 
developed idea (Cropley, 2006).  
After an idea is (tentatively) selected, individuals engage in the “late cycle” (i.e., late-
stage; Byrne et al., 2010: 119) processes of idea evaluation (validation), which involves checking 
the idea against the task criteria (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016) and possibly 
revising ideas based on the criteria (Mumford et al., 2002; Lonergan et al., 2004), and idea 
elaboration, which entails refining and adding detail to ideas as individuals prepare for 
implementation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Mainemelis, 2010).2 Because forecasting often entails 
predicting the likelihood of successful implementation, forecasting is an important component of 
idea evaluation (Mumford et al., 2002). It is also an essential precursor to the final stage of 
outcome assessment, which involves deciding whether to move forward with implementing an 
idea or to return to earlier stages to make changes (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 
2016).  
Creative forecasting. The concept of forecasting (defined as predicting outcomes more 
broadly) originates in psychology, and foundational work has focused on individuals’ ability to 
make accurate predictions about the future (e.g., Pant & Starbuck, 1990; Mumford, Schultz, & 
Van Doorn, 2001; Thomas, Clark, & Gioia, 1993; Önkal, Yates, Sigma-Mugan, & Öztin, 2003). 
Due to the longstanding divide between research on creativity, which has focused largely on the 
generation of creative ideas, and innovation, which focuses on their implementation (Amabile, 
 
2 Once individuals select a “final” idea, the idea may then be evaluated by external figures, such as domain experts 
(e.g., Amabile, 1982). However, the focus of the present discussion is the individual’s evaluation of his or her own 
ideas as candidates for further development.  
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1988; West & Farr, 1990; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; George, 2007; 
Mumford et al., 2002; Byrne et al., 2010), research on creative forecasting is relatively limited 
(Mumford, 2001; Mumford et al., 2002; Byrne et al., 2010; Berg, 2016).  
Within creativity research, the focus on prediction accuracy has manifested in research on 
individuals’ ability to judge the novelty (i.e., originality; Runco & Smith, 1992; Basadur, Runco, 
& Vega, 2000; Licuanan, Dailey, & Mumford, 2007; Silvia, 2008) or market success (Berg, 
2016) of their ideas. For instance, Runco and Smith (1992) found that individuals were better at 
assessing the originality of their own ideas than at assessing their popularity, and they provide 
evidence that assessing originality is distinct from other creative thinking skills. Licuanan and 
colleagues (2007) found that the tendency to underestimate the originality of highly novel ideas 
may be reduced by making novelty evaluation an active process and by making interactional 
processes more salient. Additionally, Silvia (2008) found that the skill of novelty evaluation is 
enhanced by openness to experience. Through a study of circus arts professionals and an 
accompanying lab experiment, Berg (2016) built on this prior work and examined predictions 
about market success. He found that creative workers were better than managers at forecasting 
the success of others’ new ideas – but not their own. This (qualified) advantage appeared to be 
due to the combination of divergent and convergent thinking required for creativity as compared 
with the emphasis on convergent thinking for the managerial role. By focusing on individuals’ 
ability to forecast the originality and success of new ideas, this body of work positions 
forecasting as a skill that increases the likelihood of creative success.  
Yet the scholarly understanding of creative forecasting has begun to reach beyond 
examining whether individuals accurately forecast the originality and success of particular ideas. 
Some work suggests that the idea evaluation stage, which includes forecasting, may be an 
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important influence on creative ideas themselves. For instance, in a study of marketing and R&D 
managers, Frankwick and colleagues (1994) found that individuals revised their strategic 
decision regarding developing a new technology as their understanding of what would drive 
organizational success changed. Forecasting may also affect whether individuals enhance their 
ideas based on the nature of the forecasted implementation. In a study of undergraduates 
proposing advertising campaigns, Lonergan and colleagues (2004) found that the creativity of 
ideas depended on the originality of the initial idea as well as the focus of implementation. 
Superior ideas resulted when novel initial ideas were combined with implementation goals 
emphasizing the efficiency of current processes or when less-novel initial ideas were paired with 
implementation goals emphasizing changing to something new. Further, the extent of forecasting 
may itself improve ideas. In another study of undergraduates proposing advertising campaigns, 
Byrne and colleagues (2010) found that more extensive forecasting boosted the quality, 
originality, and elegance of ideas. 
These streams of research show that creative forecasting is not only a process of 
predicting whether ideas will be original and succeed. Forecasting may also involve predicting 
how implementation will unfold, and forecasting whether implementation will be successful may 
prompt individuals to reshape their ideas to increase the likelihood of success. However, what 
remains, to my knowledge, unexplored is how individuals forecast the potential downstream 
effects of their work – how they consider the outcomes that may follow generating and 
implementing a successful idea. This may be an important influence on the creative process in its 
own right. As I argue below, forecasting the aftermath of implementation may influence the 
creative process due to the emotions that are engendered by considering possible downstream 
effects. 
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Creative forecasting and emotions. Research has, to my knowledge, neglected an 
important likely byproduct of forecasting: the emotional reactions that may arise when thinking 
through the outcomes that may follow the successful implementation of a creative idea. The 
emotions that emerge from forecasting such distal effects warrant scholarly examination because 
individuals often experience powerful emotions when imagining future scenarios (Taylor & 
Schneider, 1989; Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Armor, 1998), and creative work is particularly 
vulnerable to the influences of affective states (Kaufmann, 2003; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; 
Amabile & Pratt, 2016).  
With the “affective revolution” in organizational behavior (Amabile & Pratt, 2016: 173), 
a large body of work has explored the influence of affect on creativity. Much of the extant 
research on affect and creativity comes from experimental or observational quantitative studies 
that examine positive or negative affect as an input into the creative process and investigate 
resulting creative performance. This research indicates that positive affect drives creativity more 
reliably than negative affect (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). For instance, 
positive affect fosters intrinsic motivation (e.g., Isen & Reeve, 2005) and enhances creative 
thinking processes, such as by enabling access to a wider array of associations (e.g., Aspinwall, 
1998; Isen, 2000; Fredrickson, 2001). Some field work has provided further evidence for the link 
between positive affect and creativity (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Amabile & 
Kramer, 2011; Madjar, Oldham, & Pratt, 2002). For instance, Amabile and colleagues’ (2005) 
field study of professionals in chemicals, high tech, and consumer products companies found that 
positive affect both positively influenced creative work and was the most frequent affective 
response to creative episodes. Additionally, Amabile and Kramer’s (2011) work indicates that 
 26 
making even a small amount of progress in meaningful work drives positive affect as well as 
intrinsic motivation, which is one of the core drivers of creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1979, 1985). 
Other work has revealed that negative affect can drive creativity under specific 
circumstances, such as when individuals perceive that they will be recognized and rewarded for 
their work and experience their mood lucidly (i.e., exhibit clarity of feelings, George & Zhou, 
2002). Further, some research suggests that shifting between positive and negative moods over 
time may contribute to creativity (George & Zhou, 2007). Additionally, Fong’s (2006) series of 
laboratory experiments suggests that ambivalence, defined as positive and negative feelings (e.g., 
Pratt & Doucet, 2000; Fong, 2006; Fong & Tiedens, 2002; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; 
Williams & Aaker, 2002; Rothman & Wiesenfeld, 2007), can support creativity by enabling 
individuals to make unusual associations.  
Though much work has explored how positive and negative affect may, under various 
conditions, support creative outcomes, the bulk of this work has focused largely on affect as an 
input into the creative process, and it has largely examined affect that is unrelated to the creative 
work itself (cf. Amabile et al., 2005; Amabile & Kramer, 2011). Though Amabile and 
colleagues’ (2005, 2011) studies have examined positive affect as emerging from the work itself, 
to my knowledge, no prior work has investigated negative or mixed emotions that are tied to the 
focal creative task. When emotions are elicited by tasks over which individuals typically have 
some degree of psychological ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 
2001, 2003), such as creative work (Rouse, 2016), the mechanisms at play may be different, and 
negative emotions may be particularly challenging. Thus, it is unclear whether the conclusions 
from the majority of the studies reviewed here would hold when considering emotions that arise 
from creative forecasting. 
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Following feelings-as-information theory, individuals interpret their emotional states as 
information about their situation, which guides their behavior (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Schwarz, 
2002; Schwarz & Clore, 2003; Schwarz, 2011). Envisioning bringing about positive outcomes 
through one’s own work is likely a positive emotional experience, given the link between 
envisioning positive future events and experiencing positive affect (Scheier & Carver, 1985, 
1992; Andersson, 1996). The positive emotions that likely arise from envisioning the positive 
outcomes of one’s work may be an important source of intrinsic motivation during the creative 
process itself, as positive affect is associated with a sense of making progress toward goals 
(Amabile & Kramer, 2011; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997; Dweck & Leggett, 1988).  
However, particularly when creativity poses the risk of adverse effects on others, darker 
emotions may arise. Because negative affect signals that something is amiss (Schwarz, 2011), 
negative emotions tend to halt the current plan of action, shifting individuals into an analytical, 
problem-solving frame of mind (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Schwarz, 2011). When such 
negative emotions are tied to forecasting the outcomes of implementing one’s own creation, they 
may drive the creative worker to change aspects of his or her work in hopes of remedying 
perceived risks and diffusing aversive emotions. To illustrate, a creative worker could forecast 
his or her creation having unintended adverse effects on others, which could elicit concern and 
render moving forward a psychologically aversive experience. This could prompt the creative 
worker to stop the current plan of action, think critically, and potentially change his or her 
behavior. Yet if the creative worker forecasts both positive and negative outcomes, this may 
elicit emotional ambivalence, or positive and negative feelings (e.g., Pratt & Doucet, 2000; Fong, 
2006; Fong & Tiedens, 2002; Larsen, McGraw, & Cacioppo, 2001; Williams & Aaker, 2002; 
Rothman & Wiesenfeld, 2007), regarding the future of his or her work. Depending on how 
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individuals respond to ambivalence (see Pratt & Pradies, 2011, and Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & 
Pradies, 2014, for overviews of different ambivalence responses), this may impact the creative 
process in different ways.  
In sum, because of the relationship between affect, cognition, and behavior, and the 
likelihood that forecasting gives rise to a range of emotions, it is necessary to investigate how 
creative workers forecast the downstream effects of their creations, how this forecasting elicits 
emotional reactions, and how this may influence the creative process.  
 
To summarize this literature review, existing research demonstrates that creativity 
involves taking the risk of developing novel ideas, and certain types of creative ideas pose the 
risk of adversely affecting large numbers of people when they are implemented. However, we 
know little about how creative workers forecast the outcomes of implementing potentially 
harmful ideas, the emotions that may arise, and how this may influence the creative process. 
Existing models of the creative process have not accounted for these dynamics (e.g., Amabile & 
Pratt, 2016; see Lubart, 2001, for a review), and they may therefore overlook a potentially 
significant influence on the creative process. Hence, I ask the following research questions: How, 
if at all, do creative workers forecast the outcomes of implementing their potentially harmful 
creations, and what emotional experiences, if any, arise? Further, how, if at all, does forecasting 
the outcomes of implementing potentially harmful creations influence the creative process? By 
uncovering patterns in how creative workers forecast the future of their work and manage the 
emotions that arise, this dissertation aims to extend theory on the role of prospective thought 
processes in creative work and on how creative workers navigate the dark emotions that may 
arise. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
METHODS 
 
Research Approach and Sampling Context 
My research questions ask how creative workers forecast the outcomes of implementing 
their potentially harmful creations, what emotional experiences arise, and how this influences the 
creative process. To answer these questions, I used an inductive, qualitative approach to explore 
the creative work of developing new artificial intelligence (AI) technologies in real-world 
settings. A qualitative, inductive approach is appropriate, first of all, when there is little 
preexisting empirical work related to the focus of the research (Creswell, 1998; Locke, 2001; 
Lee, Mitchell, & Sablynski, 1999; Eby, Hurst & Butts, 2009). As discussed in Chapter 2, to my 
knowledge, no prior work has explored the creative process in medias res (as it happens) when 
creative workers are aware of the potential to adversely affect a large number of people through 
their work. An inductive, qualitative approach is also appropriate because my intent is to build 
theory, defined as examining previously unexplored relationships or processes (Lee, Mitchell, & 
Sablynski, 1999; Creswell, 1998; Locke, 2001), on the role of forecasting and associated 
emotions in the creative process. Finally, qualitative methods are particularly helpful for 
uncovering how complex sequences of events unfold in real-world settings (Creswell, 1998; 
Chiles, 2003; Langley, 1999). I apply an inductive, qualitative approach in a field setting because 
my research questions call for investigating creative work in a context in which implementation 
is a future reality, and creative workers therefore have a stake in its outcomes. 
Qualitative, inductive research involves selecting samples and contexts that are likely to 
reveal the dynamics of interest (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). To 
answer my research questions, I needed to identify a setting in which individuals were engaged 
in creative work that posed significant and known risks to the general public. The domain of 
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artificial intelligence (AI) development, which involves creating digital technology that rivals or 
surpasses human intelligence in its capabilities, exemplifies potentially harmful creativity (e.g., 
Urban, 2015), defined as creativity that poses the risk of adversely affecting a large number of 
people through its implementation. In AI development, individuals are creating path-breaking 
technology by developing machine learning algorithms that “learn” from data to perform 
complex tasks, such as interacting with humans; detecting emotions; classifying and producing 
text, images, and music; and predicting natural disasters. As the examples of self-driving cars 
and autonomous drones illustrate, even today, AI is capable of making life-or-death decisions 
without human input. Yet with machine learning algorithms, the complex relationship between 
input (the code that is written to create the AI) and output (what the AI does) makes it difficult 
for individuals to predict and control what their creations will do (e.g., Lehman et al., 2018); the 
algorithms that power new AI tools are often difficult for even the experts developing them to 
understand fully. 
The complexity and autonomy inherent in AI raise the potential for harmful outcomes 
(e.g., Friend, 2018; Tegmark, 2019). Although AI may help solve many of humanity’s greatest 
problems, such as disease, poverty, and global warming, the implementation of AI also poses 
significant threats. For instance, scientist and entrepreneur Elon Musk recently said: 
I’m really quite close to the cutting edge in AI, and it scares the hell out of me. 
It’s capable of vastly more than almost anyone knows. And the rate of 
improvement is exponential. …I think that’s the single biggest existential crisis 
that we face, and the most pressing one. …Mark my words, AI is far more 
dangerous than nukes. (Zipkin, 2018) 
 
The dangers of developing AI include the potential for AI tools to be weaponized, such as 
military applications of image recognition tools; the unintentional embedding of biases in AI 
systems; as well as the social and economic effects of job displacement due to AI. These 
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dynamics, coupled with the current lack of best practices regarding the ethical development and 
application of AI (Murgia & Shrikanth, 2019), make AI development a particularly appropriate 
setting to study how forecasting downstream effects influences the creative process.  
Sampling Strategy 
Using the logic of purposeful sampling (Locke, 2001; Patton, 2001), which involves 
selecting individuals or cases that are most likely to reveal the dynamics of interest, I turned to 
individuals working in artificial intelligence (AI) development to answer my research questions. 
As is often the case with inductive, qualitative research, my research questions evolved over 
time, and my sampling strategy shifted from purposeful to theoretical (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Locke, 2001) as I moved from pilot interviews into the remainder of my data collection.  
In the beginning, my research question was quite broad; I wanted to understand the 
dynamics of the creative process when adverse downstream effects could arise. Additionally, I 
wanted to explore AI as an appropriate domain for a full-scale study. I began with a purposeful 
sample of eight informants from two AI startup organizations, and I also conducted an 
informational interview with a management and information technology doctoral student with 
relevant industry experience. Because of the exploratory nature of the pilot study, I was initially 
interested in understanding AI developers’ experiences as well as other organization members’ 
views of their organizations’ work and the broader AI community. My pilot study sample 
therefore included those directly involved in machine learning algorithm development as well as 
several other members of the organizations (founding executives and a marketing director). 
Because data collection and analysis occurred in tandem, as I refined my theoretical focus 
following pilot interviews, I also shifted my sampling strategy (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Locke, 
2001) based on what I learned from initial interviews. For the remainder of my data collection, to 
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explore my research questions about forecasting the outcomes of implementing potentially 
harmful creations, emotional reactions, and the creative process, I sampled AI developers 
(specifically, machine learning algorithm developers), and rather than sampling within certain 
types of organizations, I sampled across organizations that varied in size and age as well as 
across academia and industry. 
I sampled across multiple organizations for several reasons, based on what I learned in 
initial interviews. First, I learned that the work of AI development follows a similar process of 
building, testing, and refining regardless of setting. Second, the downstream risks associated with 
this work are consistent across settings (direct harm through dangerous applications or 
malfunctioning creations; indirect harm through job displacement), though certain applications 
of new AI technologies may of course pose particular forms of these risks that are specific to 
them. I also learned through pilot interviews that, because AI is such a new domain, 
organizations lack norms regarding how to address the potential consequences of AI. As such, I 
did not find that organizational settings differentially influenced how individuals addressed the 
risks posed by their work. Additionally, and also related to the newness of AI, I learned that AI 
developers are highly interconnected; they tend to rely heavily on the broader AI research 
community. In more established types of work, individuals may find most of the resources they 
need within their organization. In AI, though, individuals in any organizational setting tend to be 
very involved in the AI research community because this is where they find most of their AI 
resources, such as new machine learning techniques to try. Finally, I also learned that in AI 
development, the lines between industry and academia are blurred: Many industry companies 
house basic research, and many academics apply their techniques in for-profit companies. 
Because of the common processes of machine learning algorithm development, the consistent 
 33 
types of possible downstream effects, the lack of organizational norms regarding dealing with 
these effects, the interconnectedness of AI developers, and the frequent collaborations between 
academia and industry, I did not limit my sampling to one organization or even one type of 
organization.  
The interconnectedness of AI developers allowed me to leverage snowball sampling, or 
chain referral sampling (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981), to achieve a theoretical sample of 
individuals engaging in potentially harmful creative work. Snowball sampling, which is used 
frequently in the social sciences, involves making use of individuals’ connections to others in 
similar contexts or roles (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). It has both benefits and downsides; its 
main downside is the likelihood of bias due to the reliance on personal and/or professional 
connections (Heckathorn, 1997, 2011; Goodman, 2011; Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). However, 
it is an appropriate sampling technique when informants are difficult to reach and/or the subject 
matter is sensitive (Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981). In my case, due to the growing public discourse 
about the dangers of AI, AI developers tend to be wary of outsiders who might bring negative 
attention to their work, and my interviews included questions about possible downstream effects, 
which could lead to the discussion of sensitive subject matter. Hence, snowball sampling was an 
appropriate technique for my research.  
My pilot interviews arose from “cold” emails to AI organizations, and I “snowballed” 
from that point onward, asking each prior informant if they could connect me with colleagues 
who might be willing to be interviewed (e.g., Petriglieri, Ashford, & Wrzesniewski, 2018). 
Throughout my data collection, I attempted to mitigate the potential bias of snowball sampling 
by asking informants to connect me with colleagues who had perspectives that might be different 
from theirs. Sometimes, informants told me outright that they thought their views might be 
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uncommon, and they proactively connected me with individuals who thought about their AI 
work differently. This effort to understand as many different perspectives as possible was a 
constant thrust throughout my sampling, and the emergence of distinct patterns in my data 
provides some assurance that my data are not biased toward one particular perspective. 
My final sample consists of 64 interviews with AI developers3 and an additional five 
interviews with AI organization executives (including five pilot interviews with AI developers 
and three with executives). I stopped recruiting additional informants when I reached theoretical 
saturation; following Glaser and Strauss (1967), I define theoretical saturation as the point at 
which new data no longer contribute new information. 
Data Sources 
Semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured interviews were my primary data source. 
For pilot interviews, I used a semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix I) that addressed 
the nature of AI development, focusing on informants’ creative and problem-solving processes 
(if they were AI developers), emotional experiences, general features of the creative product, 
comparisons between human and artificial intelligence, and views about the future of AI. Pilot 
informants predicted both positive and negative outcomes arising from their work and expressed 
both excitement and concern, but they seemed to approach their work in different ways. This led 
me to the research questions that I then explored through the remainder of my data collection: 
How do creative workers forecast the outcomes of implementing their potentially harmful 
creations, what emotions arise, and how does this influence the creative process in the present? 
 
3 AI (machine learning), like many STEM fields, is predominately male. My sample consisted of eight female AI 
developers; at 12.5% of my sample of 64 developers, this is representative of the industry (Chin, 2018). Two of the 
executives were female. 
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Following the pilot interviews, and throughout subsequent data collection, I revised my 
interview protocol (Spradley, 1979) to address the concepts that were emerging as important to 
my refined theoretical focus. In the middle and later phases of data collection, this refined focus 
was whether and how individuals constrained themselves based on how they responded to their 
ambivalence about forecasting positive and negative outcomes. Because my research questions 
were intended to uncover individual experiences and processes, I often asked informants to recall 
recent experiences and to describe ongoing or recurrent processes. Additionally, because an 
essential aspect of the study is understanding how creative workers think about the possible 
outcomes of their work, several of my questions were prospective in nature – that is, they 
addressed informants’ views about and plans for the future. The final interview protocol is 
presented in Appendix II.  
Non-participant observation. I also attended a three-day AI conference, AI World 
(Boston, December, 2018), as a non-participant observer and took notes on my experiences and 
interactions (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Creswell, 1998). The purpose of this observational data 
was twofold. First, I triangulated (Jick, 1979; McGrath, 1982; Eby, Hurst, & Butts, 2009) what I 
learned from other data sources, such as the types of risks and benefits posed by AI development. 
To do so, I attended formal presentations and approached other attendees informally during 
breaks between sessions. When approaching attendees, I identified myself as a Ph.D. student 
researching AI development, and I asked questions about their experiences with managing AI 
developers or developing AI themselves, depending on their roles.4 The themes that were 
discussed in formal presentations and the information I gleaned from informal exchanges 
supported the notion that AI developers were thinking about both the possible benefits (driving 
 
4 I did not formally interview attendees or snowball sample based on these connections, and as such, I do not include 
these conversations in my interview count. 
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scientific progress and improving people’s everyday lives) and consequences (causing direct or 
indirect harm through implementing complex and autonomous new tools) of implementing their 
work. As such, I found support for the patterns emerging from my analysis of interviews through 
this non-participant observation.  
Second, conference attendance enhanced my knowledge of industry trends and dynamics. 
For instance, I learned about recent and growing applications of AI, such as in cybersecurity, 
financial services, healthcare, and pharmaceutical research; the widespread struggle to earn the 
public’s trust in new AI tools; and the increasing attention on the ethics of AI development (e.g., 
unbiased AI) and “AI for good” (e.g., AI that supports sustainability efforts). This knowledge 
gave me additional legitimacy as an interviewer and provided useful background information for 
my interviews (Feldman, Bell, & Berger, 2003). For example, learning about the growing 
discussion of AI ethics and projects deemed morally “good” enabled me to ask informants what 
they thought about these trends and how they related to informants’ own work, if at all.  
Data Analysis 
My analysis focused on my primary data source of semi-structured interviews (pilot and 
subsequent interviews), and I used several data reduction tools in tandem with data collection 
and analysis of the full, unreduced data set. First, I took notes during each interview and 
composed contact summaries, which are structured summaries of each interview that highlight 
aspects that seem important to the research questions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Second, I 
drafted theoretical memos, which contained my ideas about the themes and patterns that were 
emerging across data (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Creswell, 1998). Third, I kept a data table, which 
compiled quotations expressing similar concepts and experiences from multiple informants 
(Wolcott, 1994; Creswell, 1998). The data table helped me to gain a clearer sense of emerging 
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patterns, categorize concepts and experiences in multiple ways, and examine how new data fit 
with existing patterns. Additionally, I used my field notes from the AI World conference as 
supplementary data, which enabled me to triangulate (Jick, 1979; McGrath, 1982; Eby, Hurst, & 
Butts, 2009) what I learned from interviews. Together, these data reduction tools served as a way 
of structuring my thinking and analysis, developing my ideas, and comparing themes and 
patterns across sources.  
I coded the complete interviews using grounded theory methods (Strauss & Corbin, 1998; 
Locke, 2001). I conducted this analysis by iterating back and forth between the data and 
emerging themes and by abstracting theoretical categories from those themes (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998). Data collection and analysis informed each other throughout this process; I coded 
interviews in batches, and I adjusted my protocol (Spradley, 1979) when needed to address 
emerging themes. For instance, the notion of constraints began to emerge during my analysis of 
initial batches of interviews, and I adjusted my protocol over time to address the presence or 
absence of constraints more explicitly. Below, for the sake of clarity, I describe this process in a 
more linear way, based on the stages described by Pratt and colleagues (2006). 
Step 1: Open coding. For each batch of interviews, I began by creating provisional, 
“open” codes of statements that seemed relevant to my research questions regarding forecasting, 
emotions, and their influence on the creative process. These provisional codes often used 
informants’ own language, reflecting back their experiences in their own terms (Locke, 2001). 
For example, “It shouldn’t ever be allowed to make decisions on its own” was coded as 
requiring human involvement, “How do we almost make sure that it doesn’t generate things we 
wouldn’t want it to generate?” was coded as controlling output, “We still have to do testing, we 
still have to do certification, we have to do retraining, we have to look at all the implications” 
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was coded as testing thoroughly, and “You should always have more people’s eyes” was coded 
as seeking external checks.  
As data analysis continued, concepts began to saturate, and my interview protocol 
evolved to ask more pointed questions about forecasted outcomes, emotions, responsibility for 
negative outcomes, and constraints. As such, my open codes also evolved to better reflect these 
emerging themes, such as the types of positive and negative outcomes individuals forecasted 
(e.g., “pushing research forward,” “predicting weaponization”), emotions related to forecasting 
(e.g., “excited about practical applications,” “worried about bias”), the degree to which 
individuals took responsibility for negative outcomes (e.g., “malicious applications seen as 
irrelevant,” “sense of moral imperative”), and the types of constraints they did or did not impose 
on their work (e.g., “refusing certain projects”). These open codes encompassed concepts that 
were common to multiple interviews rather than specific to an individual. 
Step 2: Axial coding. Next, I developed axial codes, or broader theoretical categories, 
that encompassed subsets of the open codes. For instance, the open codes of requiring human 
involvement and controlling output were categorized under the axial code of constraining 
functionality, and the open codes of testing thoroughly and seeking external checks were 
categorized as constraining release process.  
As I developed these theoretical categories, I frequently returned to the data to compare 
and categorize individuals’ perceptions and experiences. As I did so, I drafted theoretical memos 
and revised my data table. Over time, as I integrated new data into my data table and revised my 
theoretical memos, I found patterns among those who did and did not constrain their work in 
terms of how they responded to their ambivalence. Specifically, I found that informants differed 
in whether they increased or reduced their psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & 
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Liberman, 2003) from the negative outcomes that they forecasted, which related to whether they 
implemented constraints.  
I sometimes refined the associated axial codes to reflect what I learned during this stage 
of analysis. For example, during this stage, I refined my understanding of one group of 
informants, who expressed largely positive emotions about their work and did not constrain 
themselves. I had initially categorized these individuals as unambivalent due to their excitement 
about the future of their work and apparent lack of concern about potential downsides. However, 
when I returned to the data and compared these informants to others, it became clear that they 
had forecasted negative outcomes like other informants, but they seemed to have resolved their 
ambivalence by amplifying their positive thoughts and feelings about their work. I refined the 
axial codes regarding their emotions to reflect this shift in my analysis: “excitement” and 
“embracing positive outcomes” became “amplifying positive thoughts and feelings” by 
“emphasizing positive outcomes.” 
Step 3: Aggregating theoretical dimensions and developing the process model. After 
developing theoretical categories, I worked toward aggregating them into broader dimensions. 
For instance, constraining functionality and constraining release process were aggregated into 
applying self-imposed constraints, which became associated with concretizing negative outcomes 
(envisioning negative outcomes in a detail-oriented way).  
At this stage of the analytical process, I also began developing a process model that 
encompasses how forecasting positive and negative outcomes elicits ambivalence and how 
individuals respond to this ambivalence in different ways, which relate to the role of self-
imposed constraints in their work. The purpose of the process model is to extrapolate from the 
data the theoretical dynamics that have emerged from one’s analysis – to show why the data 
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matter in theoretical terms – rather than to reiterate a descriptive account of the findings 
(Langley, 1999; Chiles, 2003). As such, I pushed myself to move beyond the specifics of my 
data and to think carefully about how concepts seemed to fit together. For example, I theorized 
that the process of concretizing negative outcomes arises from commitment (Brickman et al., 
1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011) to one’s work and motivates the application of 
self-imposed constraints, and I aggregated these concepts into the novel “redistribution” response 
to ambivalence.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
FINDINGS 
 
 
Overview of Findings 
Creative ideas are inherently novel (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Oldham & Cummings, 1996; 
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Stein, 1974), and creativity therefore carries the risk of 
unpredictable outcomes. Some domains, such as artificial intelligence (AI) development, are 
marked by a particularly wide scope of impact and a heightened potential for harming the 
general public through the implementation of new creations. Under such circumstances, 
individuals may grapple with the negative downstream effects that could arise from 
implementing their work. As I have argued in the previous chapters, forecasting the outcomes of 
implementing creative ideas likely elicits emotional reactions, which may influence the creative 
process.  
Through an analysis of interviews with 64 AI developers and supplemental data (field 
notes and five interviews with AI organization executives), I find that individuals forecast both 
positive and negative outcomes arising from implementing their potentially harmful creations. 
This is associated with ambivalence, defined as “simultaneously positive and negative 
orientations toward an object” (Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014: 1454; Pratt & Pradies, 
2011; e.g., Pratt & Rosa, 2003), and how individuals respond to this ambivalence is related to 
whether they choose to constrain their creative work as it unfolds. Because my findings center on 
the role of self-imposed (rather than extrinsic) constraints, I adapt Cromwell and colleagues’ 
(2018) definition of constraints to reflect constraints that creative workers impose on their own 
work: I define the term self-imposed constraints broadly, as any limit or boundary that 
individuals impose on their creative process or its outcomes, at any stage of the creative process 
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(i.e., from choosing the types of projects that they will pursue to determining the process that 
they will use to test, refine, and implement their ideas). 
A Common Starting Point: “Noisy” Forecasting, Positive and Negative Outcomes, and 
Ambivalence 
“Noisy” forecasting. Regardless of the role of constraints in their creative process, all 
informants in my sample explained that the nature of their AI development work made it difficult 
to predict what their creations would do, let alone the downstream effects that could emerge from 
implementing them. One informant, Lance, explained: 
It’s one of those things where you don’t know what you don’t know. …And you 
hear similar stories with people who are working with AI in all kinds of 
industries. Like, what happens when we just turn it on and let it do something for 
a long time? You just get surprised at the output. 
 
Richard reasoned that the difficulty of predicting what AIs would do was related to the nebulous 
relationship between input (the code that is written to create the AI) and output (what the AI 
does) that marks machine learning algorithms: “…The relationship between what you put in and 
what you get out is so complicated, that you don’t really have a rigorous understanding of what’s 
going on necessarily.”  
This uncertainty about how AI creations may behave in the moment is related to 
uncertainty about more distal outcomes. Lance likened the domain of AI development to driving 
at night:  
…[Developing AI is] sort of like driving home at night, like you can only see 30 
feet in front of you where your headlights are. But nevertheless you can 
successfully drive all the way home only by seeing 30 feet in front of yourself. 
And that’s kind of like what this feels like a little bit – like you’re driving along, 
and at any point in time, we can only see two-ish years in the future, we think. But 
as we march along… that space of our headlights that we can see [goes] a little bit 
further. That’s what it feels like to me. 
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The creative process of AI development is infused with a sense of not knowing what one’s work 
will become or how it will be used. To add nuance to the metaphor, what exactly “home” is 
remains in question. Informants also made observations about the broader field of AI 
development that cued them to the potential for sudden changes. Zack commented on the 
relatively frequent emergence of new paradigms in AI: 
Once in a while, and within the next year or two years, someone will come up 
with a new idea, which will just completely change again. Just like this. The point 
I’m sure of, the technology is yet to be completely explored. …Maybe there will 
be something completely different from deep learning in the next year, possibly, 
which will trigger a paradigm shift, which we have not foreseen before. 
 
As a second example, Doug commented on his impression that AI development is in a period of 
acceleration; he reflected on learning that surprises could emerge in the field at any moment: 
What I see is that we are facing an acceleration right now. …At first I was 
surprised by many things, but now my state of mind is basically, okay, I’m so 
surprised by what’s going on, what will be the next thing? How big will it be? 
How exaggerated or maybe how extreme will it be? I’m kind of making jokes on 
that somehow. It’s kind of getting completely nuts. …And I have some people 
close to me who are kind of taking bets – how big will it be? AI is really 
surprising right now. …It will change many things. But I would say in the five 
last years, it’s really kind of moved up in a speed that I’ve never seen, I was not 
expecting. 
 
Hence, the constant potential for surprises in one’s own work as well as major field-level 
changes create a sense of uncertainty about how one’s work will develop over time and about the 
future of AI more broadly.  
Positive and negative outcomes. This uncertainty about the future made it difficult for 
informants to trust that their work would have only desirable effects once implemented. Rather, 
because of the risks that are inherent in developing complex and autonomous AI tools, 
informants commented on the potential for new AI technologies to have both positive and 
negative effects on the general public. Informants sometimes referenced the development of 
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nuclear energy as an analogy. Nelson said, “There definitely can be many scary ways to use a 
knife, and it will be misused. And I think the potential here (with AI) is as bad as like nuclear 
weapons and so on. It’s definitely another magnitude of problems that it can create.” Because of 
this heightened risk of uncontrollable and deleterious consequences, informants forecasted both 
positive and negative outcomes arising from implementing their work.  
Informants discussed, first of all, the potential for their work to bring about the positive 
outcomes of driving scientific progress as well as improving people’s everyday lives. As an 
example of driving scientific progress, Jenny explained her enthusiasm about contributing to 
science through her work: “[I’m involved in] figuring out algorithms and figuring out the science 
part. I see less of a concern, and more excitement there actually, because it opens new ground for 
us to dig.” She was particularly interested in contributing to the invention of human-level 
artificial general intelligence (AGI; AI that performs at or beyond a human level on multiple 
tasks): “I wish I could live long enough to see [human-level AGI]. I was born too early. It’s an 
opportunity. That’s what keeps you going. It’s great to be part of something as big as that, to be 
able to be part of the creation or the process that eventually ends up there.” As an example of 
improving people’s everyday lives, Jack described his belief that AI would enable people to 
pursue more worthwhile endeavors by replacing labor with machines: “We’ve automated all this 
stuff, and people just don’t need to do that crap anymore. So I think AI is maybe going to be one 
of the most powerful examples of that. It’s going to be different than the internet or the car. This 
is going to get to the point where it can do 90% of what an average person can do, and that’s 
going to free up a lot of hopefully productivity for people.”  
Yet informants also discussed adversely affecting large numbers of people through their 
work because new AIs could be applied in dangerous ways, unintentionally malfunction (e.g., if 
 45 
bias becomes embedded in the AI), or displace segments of the workforce due to automation. 
Hence, they forecasted precipitating forms of both direct harm (dangerous applications, 
malfunctioning creations) and indirect harm (job displacement). By direct harm, I refer to 
circumstances in which the AI tool itself is used in dangerous ways (e.g., weaponized AI – 
dangerous application) or causes harm autonomously (e.g., AI that behaves in undesired ways, 
such as due to bias – malfunctioning creation). By indirect harm, I mean that the harm is not 
caused directly by the AI, but by its usefulness as a tool, which can lead to replacing human 
workers in its domain. 
As an example of forecasting direct harm through dangerous applications, Jack predicted 
malicious applications of generative AIs, a type of AI that he was involving in developing. He 
forecasted:  
I think there’s an amazingly horrendous thing that’s going to happen. …There is 
going to be, if not this very second today, if not today, in the next ten years, easy 
– probably more like five – I guarantee my life, in 10 years, the generative AI is 
going to be so good, that the fakes will be impossible to determine by humans and 
maybe will start to fool best forensics labs in the world. What’s going to happen is 
that whoever owns a supercomputer, and whoever has a team of 20 ML experts, 
can now produce fakes of the most famous celebrities or presidents doing 
whatever they want, and it’s impossible to prove that that’s not an original. So 
what does this do? This destabilizes news, politics right? …Our society is 
completely unprepared to deal with a technology this powerful. It’s going to 
destroy so many things. It all comes down to, is there going to be an evil criminal 
gang that decides they can use this? I guarantee somewhere in the world. And 
they’re going to be amazingly powerful. 
 
To illustrate forecasting direct harm through releasing a malfunctioning creation, Christopher 
discussed the dangers of releasing an AI that had been inadequately trained:  
I remember thinking about, like, “Oh, self-driving cars, that could be huge thing,” 
where like all the training data is all of like normal looking bipeds, and then you 
have training example of maybe a kid on scooter, or someone in a wheelchair, and 
that just isn’t part of the majority class… I wonder about all those things. I 
wonder about those risks. 
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Informants also explained how their work could displace segments of the workforce by 
automating processes currently done by humans. As an example of forecasting indirect harm 
through job displacement, Matthew predicted: 
I don’t buy this thing at all that everybody will just find something better to do. 
That’s not true. That’s not true at all. I’m not a business person, but I think there’s 
plenty of people lost their jobs at Ford Motor Company Plant in the 80s who were 
never really gainfully reemployed. They didn’t become factory automation 
engineers, they just became unemployed people. For sure there are people that are 
gonna be displaced. I think that it will serve as a tool of increasing economic 
inequality. I think for sure. 
 
Informants described job displacement as potentially precipitating an upheaval of the economy. 
Ambivalence. As informants expressed their uncertainty about the future and forecasted 
both positive and negative outcomes, they expressed ambivalence, defined as “simultaneously 
positive and negative orientations toward an object” (Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014: 
1454; Pratt & Pradies, 2011; e.g., Pratt & Rosa, 2003). “Orientations” involve both thoughts 
(cognitive ambivalence) and feelings (emotional ambivalence), which often arise in tandem 
(Sincoff, 1990; Ashforth et al., 2014). In the present case, the “object” is informants’ AI 
creations, including their possible outcomes. As an example of the cognitive ambivalence that 
arises from forecasting both positive and negative outcomes, Ryan explained: 
I have to I guess acknowledge that what I’m doing could be harmful, but then 
again I’m not sure… It also could be helpful in a lot of ways. That’s what I think 
drives progress in AI is to a large extent, is all of the benefits that it brings to the 
table. So I think it’s like a lot of technologies, where there’s potential harm for 
many things that we introduce. We’re seeing all kinds of unintended 
consequences all the time. 
 
Hence, he expressed the possibilities of precipitating harm as well as making a positive impact 
through his work. He reasoned that any type of work may have unintended consequences and 
that it was important to drive progress. As an example of both cognitive and emotional 
ambivalence, Jordan expressed, “It’s difficult to guess what will happen. It definitely resonates 
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with me that you can only see, you know, see that far into the future. Which, I mean, on the other 
hand, that does not bring me fear. It brings me an equal amount of fear and excitement, right?” 
Jordan’s emotional ambivalence seemed to arise from considering the possibility of a wide range 
of outcomes. Of course, cognitions and emotions influence one another (Sincoff, 1990; Ashforth 
et al., 2014), and it is impossible to separate cognitive and emotional ambivalence in my data. As 
such, throughout my dissertation, I use the term “ambivalence” to refer to positive and negative 
thoughts and feelings. 
Ambivalence Responses and the Role of Self-Imposed Constraints 
As informants confronted the uncertainty inherent in their work, they reckoned with the 
potential for both positive and negative effects to emerge, and they experienced “mixed feelings” 
as they forecasted “mixed outcomes.” How informants responded to this ambivalence had 
important implications for their creative process in terms of the role of self-imposed constraints 
in their work. Below, I present quotations from informants to support the theoretical themes and 
processes that I have induced. Additional representative quotations that illustrate these concepts 
– as well as the concepts discussed in the prior section – are presented in Appendix III.  
1. Unconstrained Creativity Path 
One group of informants moved forward in their work without imposing constraints. 
These informants amplified their positive orientation (thoughts and feelings) toward their work 
and its future, rendered negative outcomes irrelevant to their day-to-day work, and saw 
constraints as unnecessary or as impediments.  
Amplification of positive orientation. This group of informants amplified their positive 
thoughts and feelings toward their work by creating psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope 
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& Liberman, 2003) from the negative outcomes that they forecasted. They did so by anchoring 
on the present moment and/or by emphasizing the positive outcomes that they forecasted.  
Anchoring on the present moment entails focusing on aspects of daily work, such that 
negative downstream effects are rendered irrelevant, whether by focusing on the technical details 
of work and the perceived boundaries of one’s role and/or on the limitations of the current 
technology. To begin, some informants described their absorption in the technical details of their 
work and their belief that responding to potential negative outcomes was not their responsibility.5 
Bob expressed zeroing in on current technical challenges rather than weighing distal outcomes, 
and he seemed to dismiss the connection between his work and adverse downstream effects: 
For researchers like me, we do not care too much about what the future might 
bring. Instead, we are looking into the high-impact or the burning questions we 
are having today and trying to answer it. Where it will lead us, we actually do not 
care too much. As soon as we know the problem we are attacking is meaningful, 
it’s important. Maybe we will go nowhere, maybe we actually will have Skynet. 
But for researchers like me, we do not… personally, I do not worry too much. 
 
He elaborated that although he was aware of the potential for negative downstream effects, he 
did not see constraints as part of his role: “There are a whole lot of other people who are 
worrying about the regulations, the security, about fairness, but they are in different and separate 
research areas. I do agree that these topics should be taken care of, but it’s probably by someone 
else.” 
Informants also anchored on the present moment by reasoning that the limitations of the 
current technology made it unlikely that their work would precipitate negative effects within a 
relevant timeframe. Several informants, such as Sean, commented that current AI creations were 
not as sophisticated as people thought: 
 
5 One informant speculated that focusing on improving his technical skills would allow him to better prepare for the 
threats he expected, such as job displacement and malicious applications of new technologies. However, no other 
informants described thinking this way. 
 49 
Ultimately what the systems are doing, at least when they’re learning, is they’re 
optimizing the functions using gradient descent usually. So gradient descent has 
been around since Newton. And so it’s not all that spectacular. It’s basically 
multivariable calculus. And then we’re applying that with more data than we used 
to have, and we can do that because we have slightly better computers than we 
used to have. And so combine that with humans, who tend to take the intentional 
stance about everything, and it’s very easy to think that AI is super awesome, but 
actually it’s very rudimentary multivariable calculus. 
 
He explained that, because he believed that AI was so rudimentary, he was not afraid of the 
future of AI: 
I think it’s important to just realize how insignificant everything is and how far 
we still have to go. I guess that’s also the answer for dealing with the fear aspect. 
I think people grossly misunderstand the capabilities of modern AI systems and 
really think that strong AI is around the corner, which I definitely don’t think it is. 
So machine learning is just fitting a bunch of parameters to a maximum likelihood 
estimation. So you can learn some statistical properties of the world, but doing 
more sophisticated things is pretty much still beyond this I think. So we still have 
a long way to go. 
 
Informants taking this stance also expressed that, because they did not expect major changes to 
take place soon, they did not feel guilty about playing a part in the negative outcomes that they 
forecasted: 
I don’t feel that guilty that much right now. …At this point in the evolution of AI, 
the displacement is small, and it’s going to stay small for a long time. For sure, 
the things that are going to be displaced right now, yeah, it’s going to be more 
rote things, things that require a low degree of creative input or whatever. But I 
think this is gonna increase, right? It’s not gonna go away. It’ll be a tiny 
percentage every year forever. It will have a wide impact. It’s that old thing about 
boiling the frog – the frog doesn’t notice that he’s in boiling water because it’s 
only raising a tenth of a degree every minute. So it isn’t gonna be a sharp spike in 
displacement, it’s just gonna happen slowly over time. (Matthew) 
 
Informants also created psychological distance from negative outcomes by emphasizing 
the relative importance of the positive outcomes of driving scientific progress and/or improving 
people’s everyday lives. As an example of emphasizing the positive outcome of driving scientific 
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progress, Dennis explained his view that, although his creations could be used in dangerous 
ways, contributing to science through his work was more important:  
Yeah, my work is linked indirectly with this [threat of weaponized robots]. …My 
work is one more brick in the building of adaptive robots and autonomous robots. 
If you want to have efficient robotic soldiers on the battlefield, you need the kinds 
of things I do. Of course. But if we stop to work in science because people will 
use it in not a good way, we stop to do science. For me it is not like… It is not a 
concern for me. 
 
As an example of emphasizing the positive outcome of improving people’s everyday lives, Jenny 
expressed her optimism about replacing human labor with AI: 
I’m very optimistic about this job thing that people talk about. Because I actually 
have a vision in the future that people don’t have to work, because the wealth will 
be grown by automation and all the advanced technologies. So not having a job is 
not a bad thing. And we can eradicate poverty, we can eradicate disease, we can 
give ourselves more purpose, we can make ourselves more robust, we can go to 
other worlds, live on the moon or Mars or something. And all that I think has to 
do with us building these technologies that make it possible. …You get to this 
superhuman that doesn’t have diseases and is not poor and can concentrate on 
positive things, construction, be creative. 
 
Informants who emphasized positive outcomes often reasoned that any negative effects that 
might arise from their work, such as the weaponization of their creations or job displacement, 
would be outweighed by attaining the positive outcomes that they forecasted. 
By creating psychological distance from negative outcomes, these informants amplified 
their positive orientation toward their work, therein resolving their ambivalence. To illustrate, 
Andrea expressed her optimistic view of AI, the importance of her AI research work, and her 
hopes that AI would become ubiquitous: 
I think I’m very optimistic about the future of AI. I think at this point it’s all about 
research. So you cannot find any example of, like, cars or something for 
autonomous driving – I think we’re quite far from that. But maybe in a few years, 
the research will be still ahead, but industry will catch up. …So, yes, I am very 
optimistic. …What I hope to see happen in my lifetime is AI becoming, being 
used, so you could find it all around you. 
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Hence, despite the fact that they forecasted negative outcomes arising from implementing their 
creations, these informants were ultimately largely optimistic about the future of their work and 
AI in general. 
Unconstrained creativity. Informants who amplified their positive orientation toward 
their creations viewed constraints as unnecessary or even as impediments to their work. For 
instance, Andrea voiced her belief that constraints would be counterproductive, reasoning that it 
is necessary to take risks in order to progress: 
There was this example from Facebook, I think. They tried to get two neural 
networks, two AIs to talk to each other, and at some point, they developed their 
own language, and the researchers couldn’t understand them anymore, so they 
just shut them down. I mean, so what? [Laughing] Let them talk! …There are 
risks of course, but if you don’t try it, the research will never progress. 
 
Nick voiced a similar perspective, fearing that constraints would halt scientific progress: “You 
cannot control everything, and so you don’t know what everybody will do with AI. And 
sometimes this will also have the negative effect of people trying to pose resistance to AI and 
slowing down the research process.” Hence, some informants saw constraints as an impediment 
to their ability to engage in their work and achieve the positive outcomes that they forecasted.  
Engagement in work: These informants enjoyed their work and seemed immersed in the 
technical challenges before them, and as such, they may be described as engaged in their work – 
that is, exhibiting involvement in, satisfaction with, and enthusiasm for their work (Harter, 
Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002). For instance, Sean said, “I think AI is very interesting, so if you take 
away all the hype, it’s basically the most interesting problem I think you can work on because 
it’s about the most fundamental question you can ask as a scientist, almost, which is what makes 
humans human.” Jacob described finding enjoyment and awe in his AI development work: 
I was experimenting with this music app that I was building, and all of a sudden it 
started feeding back on itself, and then the feedback started feeding back from 
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itself, and all of a sudden it almost sounded like something was speaking to me. It 
was terrifying and amazing at the same time, and it was such a simple algorithm 
that was running. I have never felt that way doing traditional software 
development, but I’m starting to get inklings of that again now, where it surprises 
you in ways you don’t expect. …It’s the kind of thing where the solution that it 
gets is so unlike yours that it just, it’s mind-blowing to me. 
 
To summarize the “unconstrained creativity” path, these informants seemed able to engage in 
their work because they had created psychological distance from negative outcomes and 
amplified their positive thoughts and feelings. As such, they moved forward without imposing 
constraints on their work. 
2. Heedful Creativity with Self-Imposed Constraints Path 
Though informants discussed in the prior section did not constrain their work, the 
majority of my sample (46 of 64) responded to their ambivalence in a different way. These 
informants were committed to their work (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & 
Pradies, 2011) in that they accepted that both positive and negative outcomes would likely occur. 
Though they were simultaneously excited about positive outcomes, these informants tended to 
concretize the negative outcomes that they forecasted – to envision them in a detail-oriented 
way. Concretizing seemed to give rise to negative emotions like worry and concern, temporarily 
amplifying informants’ negative orientation toward their work. However, these informants took 
responsibility for negative outcomes by imposing constraints on their work, which enabled them 
to “redistribute” their ambivalence and strengthen their positive orientation toward their 
creations. Because these informants thought critically about the negative outcomes that they 
forecasted and responded by approaching their work with greater caution, I refer to this path as 
entailing “heedful” (Ryle, 1949; Weick & Roberts, 1993) creativity. 
Commitment to work. These informants accepted that both positive and negative 
outcomes would emerge from implementing their creations. To illustrate, Ray expressed his 
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acceptance that positive and negative outcomes would arise from creating a “powerful tool” like 
AI: “When you have a very powerful tool, there’s going to be good and bad consequences. There 
are good and bad people using it. We can come up with something that recognizes who a person 
is, what they are intending to do – that can be used for good or bad.” As another example, Gary 
reflected on his belief that AIs would solve hard problems – and likely be applied in unethical 
ways as well as displace human jobs:  
I think misuse of AI and a lot of applications which are maybe ethically arguable 
are going to come out. Because these models are getting better and better at 
human intelligence tasks, like recognizing faces. A very useful application for a 
military organization would be to recognize the face of someone they want to kill 
and then kill them. That’s very good for them. …So I guess the way I see it is 
optimistic, in that we’re going to keep solving these hard-to-solve problems that 
no one thinks a machine can do, and we’re going to do it more and more 
accurately. And negatively because I think that corporations are going to be using 
these models in ways that are going to net them revenue. …So I guess that’s how 
I see AI going, is replacing a lot of [jobs] – or even introducing new ways for 
people to automate at a large scale these human intelligence problems. And that to 
be used by corporations and the government for both positive and negative. 
 
Frank echoed this acceptance of positive and negative outcomes arising from his work and noted 
his plan to continue to develop AI tools:  
I really do, I believe there’s some both really exciting and scary possibilities when 
you combine machine learning and blockchains, if you have like blockchains that 
have intelligence baked in about how to change themselves. …It’s definitely 
something I’ll keep using. 
 
I describe these informants as being committed to their work, drawing on Brickman and 
colleagues’ (1987) conceptualization of commitment in terms of the binding of positive and 
negative orientations toward an object through choice. In the present context, AI developers 
bound their positive and negative orientations toward their creations by accepting the positive 
and negative outcomes that they forecasted. This commitment seemed to manifest in two 
cognitive and emotional processes: excitement about positive outcomes (tied to acceptance of the 
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positive) and concretizing negative outcomes (tied to acceptance of the negative). Hence, though 
I have introduced the notion of commitment in the present section, informants’ commitment to 
their work is implicit in processes described below. 
Excitement about positive outcomes. Informants expressed enthusiasm for the positive 
outcomes that they forecasted and were dedicated to their work as a way of achieving them. For 
example, Marie explained her view that AI would help improve people’s lives in multiple ways: 
AI can really help us to better our understanding of the world. It can help us to 
spend more time on interesting things and can help us to become more intelligent. 
So for me, AI can really give some positive, very positive applications for us. And 
also, there are AI, for example, to help poor people improve their life conditions. 
We can also say that AI can help us to become – to don’t have any problem (sic), 
for everyone, it could be possible. So this kind of motivation, still it is quite 
important for me. 
 
Joe echoed this sentiment: “I can see a future where AI will help people in many things in life, 
and will replace many jobs, and maybe will improve many things in society.” Steven expressed 
his “love” for his job as a way of solving complex problems: “That’s why you love this job, are 
the unexpected outcomes you end up having, simple ideas that actually make it to algorithms that 
solve complex problems. They solve complex problems, but with surprisingly simple solutions. 
And this is what makes things exciting.” 
Concretizing negative outcomes. Just as these informants were excited about realizing 
the positive outcomes that they forecasted, though, their commitment also manifested in their 
acknowledgment of the negative sides of their work. Rather than increasing psychological 
distance from potential negative outcomes, they tended to envision these outcomes in a detail-
oriented way, which I refer to as concretizing. Through concretizing negative outcomes, 
informants seemed to (temporarily) amplify their negative thoughts and feelings about their work 
and develop a sense that they needed to address the negative outcomes. 
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Concretizing outcomes appears to have roots in the process of assessing how a nascent 
idea could develop. To illustrate, Thomas explained his tendency to envision what his creations 
could become: 
Maybe the deeper thing here is a little bit about potential. Research-grade stuff is 
pretty ugly, it’s aesthetically unappealing. In my particular case, it’s a little 2D 
world, and it’s almost like stick figures, and that kind of… In my mind, I’m 
seeing the sort of “dot dot dot,” maybe reskinning this, looking like 2D blob 
characters, or having a cartoon sort of version of it. …There’s some core idea, and 
it has a certain amount of potential. And you’re always trying to assess, basically, 
what’s the maximum potential of this thing? 
 
This tendency to see the potential of an idea includes envisioning the potential downstream 
effects that could emerge from implementing it. Ray explained how future scenarios once 
deemed purely science fiction now seemed more realistic, which made the risks of implementing 
new inventions “real” as well – and created a need to address them:  
…You see that, “Wow, this might actually happen.” But your perception of it 
becomes more broad. You start seeing that, well, there are things that we now 
have to deal with. We didn’t think of biases before, now we have to think about it. 
We didn’t think of safeguarding and making systems robust, we have to think 
about it next. We have to think of how we actually combine human brain 
processes with mechanical processes… So there’s a broadening of that. …Now 
it’s like, “Yeah, there’s more concrete, cool things – there’s also things that we 
have to deal with to make sure they don’t happen.” They become more concrete.  
They become more clear and more real. 
 
As an example of concretizing, Zack described his fears about how his creations could be used 
by those with malicious intents:  
For what I do, with the ethics is also there. …It’s a very disruptive technology, 
but, I mean, mastering the atom bomb was one. …Yes, I guess, I now can make 
some tools which would be very useful for dictators. And, okay, I was kidding 
about Trump, but if you look at what’s happening in China, I mean, in China, 
there is a really a big push to apply these techniques to everybody, so I’m not sure 
that’s a good thing. But if I were to be afraid for the future, okay, AI is part of it. 
…There is a big problem with ethics. …AI, in the hands of a dictator, is… the 
Second World War would have been very different if there was this technology.  
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As he envisioned how possible adverse effects might play out, such as by emboldening dictators, 
Zack seemed to see the connection between negative outcomes and his own work.  
When potential outcomes become more concrete, psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; 
Trope & Liberman, 2003) is reduced; concretizing seemed to motivate informants to take action 
to reduce the likelihood of negative outcomes. Christian voiced this feeling of responsibility for 
the future of his creation: “It’s feeling responsible for what I was doing. …I think it really stems 
from my strong belief that when you develop a system, a technology, whatever it is, you carry at 
least part of the responsibility of what this technology is going to become.” Christian considered 
partaking in risk mitigation to be a “moral imperative.” He said, “If you are not part of this, in 
my opinion, this is where you would be responsible of those outcomes, because you didn’t want 
to look. It’s a kind of moral imperative, if I may say, to really be aware of the possible 
consequences of the technology that you helped develop.” Adam reflected on his newfound 
sense of responsibility for the potential downstream effects of his work: 
The more I think about it, the more I think there is some responsibility to make 
sure that you’ve at least thought a little bit about that. …Like otherwise where 
does the moral responsibility lie? …Maybe we’d all be better served if we thought 
a little bit about the downstream effects, the system we’re embedded in, and what 
we’re contributing. 
 
As informants concretized the negative outcomes that they forecasted and developed a 
sense of urgency to take responsibility for them, their negative thoughts and feelings about their 
creations seemed to temporarily amplify. Adam described his “deep concern” about the future 
and his desire to answer the question, “How do we improve our situation without too much risk 
of hitting a place where the outcome is catastrophic?” Though he was enthusiastic about 
realizing positive outcomes through his work, he was deeply concerned about potential adverse 
effects. Adam expressed that he felt primarily pessimistic when thinking about the future of his 
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work: “I’m feeling a little pessimistic about [the future], I guess [laughing].” He specified that 
his fears focused on the risks associated with creating an intelligence that could surpass humans: 
“…If we did create something truly intelligent, then there is some risk of displacing what 
actually enables our own evolutionary success. So we were flexible and smart, but then there’s 
something smarter than us, and that could be risky.” Similarly, Kevin expressed his fears about 
others’ implicit trust in AI, his fear about the future, and his resulting cautious approach to his 
work: “I don’t think I’m very excited. We’ve put a lot of trust in these algorithms, and as I think 
you’ve gathered, we don’t fully understand how they work, why they work. …So I think I’m less 
excited and more cautious in many cases.”  
Heedful creativity with self-imposed constraints. As informants considered the negative 
outcomes of their work in a detail-oriented way, the amplification of negative thoughts and 
feelings appeared to compel them to take action. As an example, Barry expressed his concerns 
about his team’s technology being used in potentially harmful ways and his desire to put a stop 
to the current plan for his work: 
I got mad at people because they put up this blog post about how these pre-crime 
prevention programs were the new cool thing to use deep learning for, and it was 
like, “Dude, why are we promoting this? This is, like, an insane thing to be 
doing.” We should really be taking a step back and asking, “Why should people 
be using the technology this way?” Because in the long run, people are probably 
going to say, “It shouldn’t be used this way.” So let’s just take five minutes to 
think. Just cause it’s new and unregulated and doing crazy new things doesn’t 
make it all good. My new kick that I’m on is like, where are they using this stuff 
that they really shouldn’t be? 
 
Due to their concern regarding the negative downstream effects that they concretized, these 
informants used self-imposed constraints to take responsibility for negative outcomes, which 
seemed to enable them to move forward in their work with significantly less concern.  
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Self-imposed constraints take a number of forms, which are generally tied to forecasting 
particular types of negative outcomes, and they occur at particular stages of the creative process. 
Below, I describe each type of constraint within three broader groups that reflect the purpose of 
each type of constraint: eliciting a sense of positive moral valence, control over the creation, or 
trust in its quality. By implementing constraints that served these purposes, informants seemed to 
develop a sense that they had placed necessary boundaries around their creative process and/or 
its outcomes and that they could explore openly within these boundaries. I describe these self-
imposed constraints independently of one another, but they are not mutually exclusive; 
informants often constrained their work in multiple ways. Table 1 shows how I have categorized 
these self-imposed constraints in terms of the purpose they seem to serve.  
Table 1: Types of Self-Imposed Constraints Categorized by Purpose 
Positive Moral 
Valence 
Constraining Project 
Choice 
  
Control Constraining 
Functionality 
Requiring Full 
Understanding 
 
Quality Constraining Input Constraining Own 
Reactions 
Constraining Release 
Process 
 
Positive moral valence: One method of taking responsibility for forecasted negative 
outcomes entails refusing to pursue projects for which one forecasts causing direct harm through 
dangerous applications. Constraining project choice enabled informants to develop a sense that 
their creations had a positive moral valence – that they were inherently good or safe. This 
constraint takes place at the beginning of the creative process, when individuals are identifying 
the problem or task that they will address (Amabile, 1983, 1988; see also Lubart, 2001).  
Informants described choosing not to take on projects for which they forecasted 
dangerous applications, such as in the military. To illustrate, Thomas recounted:  
There was a … Defense project, and all they wanted to know was to count the 
number of cars that were in a city using aerial photography. And it’s just like, I 
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personally just didn’t want to be anywhere near that. …It doesn’t take too many 
hops of the imagination to imagine why you’d need to count cars from aerial 
photography. …I was like, “I can’t be on this project, I can’t do stuff – I don’t 
want to be involved in aerial photography.” So that was a decision basically on 
the set of problems that I’m interested in working on. 
 
Similarly, Henry described forecasting dangerous applications for a particular technology and 
consequently deciding not to pursue that line of work: 
One recent thing, I said I will not work on that because I think it’s too dangerous. 
There was a car, and that car was sponsored by Defense, and they say things like, 
“We want to get real-time video processing with AI capacity for embedded 
systems.” And I said, “No.” No, no, no, I will never touch that. Because I see that 
this is a direct image that will support drones, like smart drones, because you 
know if it’s able to process video in real-time, then you could just put this on 
drones and be able to make object/face recognition with this. This is one key 
technology that will lead to dangerous things like drones that will… So I just 
answered, “No.” Because someone asked me, “Would you be interested to work 
on that?” And I just said, “No, no, no, no, no.” I will be really far away from that. 
I will never touch these things. 
 
Constraints on project choice sometimes drove informants to focus on a relatively narrow subset 
of challenging problems that had a positive moral valence. Adam, mentioned earlier, described 
his “ongoing struggle” with wondering whether his work would make a positive contribution to 
the world or if it would be used in a malicious way. He decided to constrain his choice of 
projects to focus explicitly on developing machine learning algorithms that would be used as AI 
safety tools: 
These days I’ve switched my focus of research to a subfield called AI safety. And 
some of the concerns with AI safety are very practical, about making sure that 
algorithms do what we expect them to do. …You probably don’t want, I don’t 
know, a sidewalk package delivery robot to probably be surprising you and 
running onto the road or something, because that would be bad. …And there’s a 
grander sort of facet of AI safety, which is – if you’re familiar with Nick 
Bostrom, a philosopher who’s quite concerned about the existential risk of AI for 
example. …I think it’s worth thinking about. I’m also getting more into the AI 
ethics space, the ethics of AI and making sure that the AI behaves ethically. And 
making sure that we understand what that means. …For now, [focusing on AI 
safety] is sort of a nice resolution to my ongoing existential crisis. At least I feel 
like I’m pushing on the positive valence sort of outcomes. …I feel like I have 
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more confidence that I at least understand – that I’m trying to do something 
useful. 
 
Hence, choosing to pursue projects that are expected to benefit and protect humanity provides a 
powerful antidote to the fear that can arise when confronting the possibility of harmful outcomes 
for certain types of projects. By choosing projects that they believed were inherently good or safe 
– and by declining projects that they believed would be used in dangerous ways – informants 
developed a sense that their creations would be beneficial for the general public.  
Control: Informants took responsibility for various concerns about implementing their 
work by imposing constraints that provided a sense of control over their creations. Control 
constraints arose from forecasting direct harm through dangerous applications and/or 
malfunctioning creations as well as indirect harm through job displacement. As Steven 
explained, “We are moving on the right direction by increasing the awareness that the more AI is 
capable of doing things, the more we need to be cautious about controlling what it does.” Two 
types of constraints engender a sense of control over the creation: constraining functionality and 
requiring full understanding. Constraining functionality and requiring a full understanding occur 
in the middle and final stages of the creative process, respectively, as individuals grapple with 
the desire to wield authority over creations that are capable of acting autonomously.  
Constraining functionality refers to restricting the capabilities of the creation in some 
way, such as requiring the involvement of a human decision maker, to prevent the AI from acting 
autonomously in dangerous ways or to prevent job displacement. This constraint takes place 
during the idea elaboration stage, when a particular idea is being further developed and refined 
based on its forecasted implementation (Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Mainemelis, 2010). As an 
example, Barry reflected on the “scary” thought of fully autonomous AI and the importance of 
human involvement in the use of his technology: “I mean, [fully autonomous AI] is a scary 
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thought. It’s helpful to be shown what the thing thinks that you should do, but in my opinion, it 
shouldn’t ever be allowed to make decisions on its own without some level of human oversight.” 
Other informants echoed this desire to place limits on the functionality of their creations based 
on concerns for how humanity might be affected if they were to pursue total automation. Alan 
spoke of his personal evolution toward combating the possibility that his creation would be used 
to replace humans:  
An expectation that became increasingly important as time went on was not just 
that it wasn’t yet capable of replacing humans. It moved from that to me wanting 
to express that I didn’t want it to replace humans. And then it’s moved from that 
lately to I am actively working against the ability that it could ever replace 
humans. So now I consider part of the goals of my research are to actually make 
my work resistant to that function. So even if someone read my papers and 
wanted to build a similar system, it would not do what they want it to. 
 
He described working toward this goal by ensuring this his creation would “maintain a 
dependence on human beings,” such as by requiring human input at different stages. He also 
described his goal of intentionally making “clumsy assistants,” such as by restricting the speed at 
which they produced output:  
My goal is now to have it take a month to make a game. Like, I want it to really 
take forever. So instead of trying to solve the problem of how does [Game Design 
AI] generate art, it’s going to commission an artist, and it’s going to send them a 
spec, and it’s going to hopefully negotiate what kind of art it wants. …And it’s 
not just that it’s dependent on humans; it has to wait for humans. So it can’t, like, 
make 300 games in a day, because it has to wait, like, a week for the artist to 
email it back. So I’m kind of engineering slowness into the system, and I like that.  
 
Hence, Alan addressed his fears regarding job displacement by proactively incorporating human 
involvement and restricting the speed at which his AI would produce output.  
Informants also described necessitating developing a complete understanding of their 
creations so that the AI could be reverse-engineered – and thereby stopped from proceeding 
further – should harmful outcomes begin to arise. Requiring a full understanding occurs just after 
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the outcome assessment stage – that is, once one has decided to move forward with 
implementing a particular idea (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016), and it entails 
preventing oneself from implementing the idea before a full understanding is achieved. Steven 
exemplifies this strategy for creating a sense of control over the creation: 
We need to … make sure we understand what AI is, then be transparent with 
regards to the algorithmic processes of AI, so we can actually reverse-engineer if 
necessary, right? Otherwise, if the algorithmic process is sitting in a black box 
that we don’t understand, then it’s not necessarily a good idea, in the long run. 
That’s what I’m saying. We need transparency, as much as possible. Then, we 
would be able to situate AI where it belongs, or where we want it to belong, by 
controlling the procedures. The problem starts when AI hides [laughs] – starts 
hiding information from us, and transparency is lost, and I think this is a problem.  
 
As Steven struggled with uncertainty about the outcomes that could arise, such as AIs that “hide” 
information from humans, he resolved that the best way to manage this was through working 
toward developing a complete understanding of the AI, which gave him a reassuring sense of 
control. 
Quality: When forecasting the negative effects that could result from releasing a 
malfunctioning creation, informants also implemented constraints that allowed them to trust in 
the quality of their creations. Quality constraints include constraining input, constraining own 
reactions, and constraining release process. Similar to control constraints, these occur in the 
middle and late stages of the creative process. By taking steps to ensure that their creations 
would be robust, high-quality tools, informants developed trust that their AIs would perform well 
and ultimately help – rather than harm – the general public.  
Constraining input refers to determining that the data that go into the creation – and 
directly affect its output – are deemed safe. This involves taking extra steps during data 
processing to ensure that biased or otherwise unsafe data are identified and excluded to the 
extent possible. How safe is defined varies depending on the nature of the AI, but most 
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commonly, constraining input refers to reducing bias or using non-sensitive data. This may occur 
during the idea validation (evaluation) stage (checking idea against task criteria and possibly 
making broad revisions, Amabile, 1983, 1988; Mumford et al., 2002; Lonergan et al., 2004; 
Amabile & Pratt, 2016) or elaboration stage (refining and adding detail to idea; Mainemelis, 
2010). If the data that the creation receives as input are seen as safe, this creates trust that the AI 
will be unlikely to cause adverse effects, such as reinforcing harmful biases. To illustrate, Kevin 
reflected on witnessing colleagues unknowingly introduce bias into their creation:  
These researchers had trained the model, and just using the data that was 
available, they introduced sexism and racism into a model because the data that 
they were provided is coming from … our world, and therefore it is racist and 
sexist. And thereby we are teaching it what we in a sense already know, which is 
those intrinsic attributes. And it’s unsettling because, at least with humans, we to 
some degree expect that. We know what’s on the table with humans. But now 
we’re introducing something that we don’t understand, and we’re teaching it the 
same things that we have. With AI, you wouldn’t necessarily expect that you’d 
have the same biases in there. And it’s upsetting that in our quest to create a better 
a world with technology, you’re mimicking the one that we already live in.  
 
He described his concern about biased data and his conclusion that extra steps should be taken at 
the data input stage to prevent this issue: 
There’s a bit of a myopic view in tech. And you know, not everybody took the 
liberal arts 101 classes to educate them that, you know, they are – they have these 
shortcomings, and that’s why they don’t necessarily even see the shortcomings in 
the data. You have to … be aware of the bias implicit in yourself in order to see it 
in the world around you. And, so, I think it has to start with the people who are 
working on it. 
 
Ray reflected on the role that AI developers may play in developing practical solutions 
that prevent the AI from reinforcing unwanted biases:  
And I don’t think there’s any more an excuse, that, “Hey, that’s in the data, so 
what can we do?” No, we can do things about it. And it’s good to see that those 
kinds of systems are happening. And it’s a challenge. Indeed it doesn’t happen on 
its own, I mean the systems are biased if you just let them do what happens 
naturally. So we have to build technology that prevents that from happening. 
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Hence, some informants recognized that rather than simply using any available data, they could 
create a more robust tool by introducing additional steps into data processing. While it may not 
be possible to eliminate bias entirely, given that human bias is often implicit and unconscious 
(Greenwald & Krieger, 2006), these informants worked to reduce bias as much as possible and 
developed trust that their creations would be reliable and safe contributions to society. 
Constraining one’s own reactions refers to replacing enthusiasm with skepticism. This 
constraint takes place when a particular idea is being validated, or checked against the task 
criteria (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). Informants who constrained their 
reactions spoke of the importance of being skeptical of positive outcomes, which they learned 
could be false positives and could cause harmful effects if trusted. They also described learning 
to be humble about what their AIs could do rather than blindly trusting that they would benefit 
humanity. For example, Gary described the risk of releasing a malfunctioning creation:  
Models, they’re just learning from data, so sometimes they can learn from data in 
a way which doesn’t mean that they’re learning these representative, interesting 
concepts, but instead they’re learning very particular, precise details from that 
particular data set. …So if you deploy that model in the real world, …then it’s 
going to perform worse.”  
 
He said that “a lot of problems” can arise from relying solely on model output to gauge an AI’s 
safety and usefulness once implemented in real-world settings: “By just looking at the accuracy, 
I misunderstood what makes a model good. And what makes a model good is that it can 
generalize and can be applied to similar data and give a good result.” After repeated experiences 
with initial results misrepresenting how well the technology was actually performing, Gary 
learned to question positive results in order to reduce the likelihood of releasing a malfunctioning 
creation: 
I’ve kind of built a certain skepticism towards ideas and kind of trying them out. 
So for me it was almost like a series of times where I kind of evaluated something 
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using these metrics in an incorrect way, and what ended up happening was, I 
evaluated it in an incorrect way, got excited, “Oh wait, let me just look into this a 
little bit more. I did it all wrong. I need to do it again!” So, yeah, I’d say that’s 
where that skepticism comes from. I do something, get excited, “Oh, it didn’t 
work, I need to be a little bit more mindful and skeptical when it comes to 
results.” …This is a long-time build-up of: I try something, I’m so happy it works, 
I look into it a little bit more, it doesn’t work. That happens over and over and 
over again until you realize, “Okay, I’ve got good results – why do I have good 
results?” Your first instinct isn’t like, “Yeah!” It’s, “This is weird, I’m not used to 
seeing this. We should look into this a little bit more.” What usually happens is, 
okay, we did this wrong, and we did this wrong. So that means maybe these 
results aren’t as good as we thought. 
 
Because of the harmful outcomes that can emerge if false positives are interpreted as valid 
indicators, learning to be skeptical of positive outcomes is an important step in developing a 
robust tool that is less likely to malfunction.  
Yet constraining one’s own reactions involves more than the day-to-day evaluation of 
output. Informants also spoke of the dangerous tendency to overestimate the positive 
contributions of AI and to develop blind trust in AI tools. To counteract this, they also 
constrained their reactions by maintaining a skeptical, modest view about what their work would 
ultimately contribute once implemented. For example, Nelson described his perspective of 
maintaining humility about progress: 
Anytime engineers or someone else come up with a new technology, we tend to 
not see the downsides, I mean we tend to overestimate the positives. So it’s not 
only for cynical reasons, it’s because that’s how we work: We want progress. We 
want to focus on the positive, and we need to focus on that. So, I think it is good 
to be humble in a sense. So, it’s just kind of a reminder. You have to be humble 
and realize that it’s very unlikely that deep neural nets will solve all or major part 
of all AI problems. It’s going to become a more complex thing. 
 
By approaching positive results with skepticism and maintaining a humble stance about 
the future of their work, these informants gained deeper knowledge of their creations’ underlying 
functionality – and perhaps most importantly, their limitations. Informants implementing this 
constraint reminded themselves to question positive results, shine light on black boxes, and 
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counteract blind trust. With this greater knowledge of their creations’ capabilities and limitations, 
informants seemed to gain confidence that they could predict how their tools would perform, 
which would give them opportunities to make their creations more robust and therefore safer for 
the general public.  
Finally, constraining the release process, a late-stage constraint that follows outcome 
assessment (deciding whether to move forward with implementing an idea), entails introducing 
extra checks into the process of implementing the creation. Informants who constrained their 
release process described the need for thorough testing and refinement based on the potential 
harm that could arise from releasing a malfunctioning creation. For instance, Christopher 
recounted witnessing a new AI tool fail to identify a person of color; the AI had been trained and 
tested only on Caucasian individuals. He recalled, “Wow, that person walked away maybe a little 
confused, and maybe they didn’t understand why it wasn’t working for them. Or maybe they got 
it, too, and maybe this has happened more than once for them.” This experience attuned him to 
the harmful outcomes that may emerge from implementing a malfunctioning creation, and he 
developed more thorough release process. He explained, “So, yeah, and that made me think, like, 
‘Wow, okay so you should always have more people’s eyes.’ Whatever you build then goes out 
into the world. People are interpreting it and trying to make sense of it. And more than sharing 
data with it, but they’re interacting with it too.” Rather than proceeding to implement a tool that 
seemed to perform well, Christopher built more thorough checks into his release process to 
mitigate the risk of releasing a poorly performing AI in the future: 
…Maybe talking about it, talking about how your algorithm works, or like 
demoing it early so you can see the risks or perils… So I think always thinking 
about those risks early on prevents you from having the big hiccups. …I guess 
inspecting the model or, like, you could almost, like, interview this graduate, or 
interview this model: ‘How do you do for these edge cases?’ And if someone that 
we were selling our machine learning model to asked about those, I would really 
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want to try to find some example data and see how it does. And to see, like, how 
does it perform for these small samples and develop a trust for that. 
 
As with constraining input and reactions, constraining the release process involves improving the 
robustness of the AI creation. This allowed informants to trust that their creations would be high 
quality and therefore less likely to cause harm by malfunctioning.  
Engagement in work: Perhaps surprisingly, informants who constrained their work 
ultimately seemed highly involved in, satisfied with, and enthusiastic about their creative AI 
work; as such, they may be described as engaged in their work (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 
2002). For instance, Barry described finding his work fun, challenging, and exciting: 
I think the whole process of designing the topology and stuff is a really fun 
experience. Like trying to come up with a neural net that hasn’t existed before, 
like working on data and working on a problem that hasn’t been solved is really 
exciting. …It’s like, it’s a new problem, and you don’t know how good you can 
solve it, or if you can even solve it at all. That would be my takeaway message, is 
that there’s lots of cool problems to solve and it’s fun to try to solve them. I was 
being a little pessimistic [earlier], but there are lots of cool things you can do with 
it. It’s actually really, really exciting stuff to be working on. 
 
These informants also described enjoying the surprises that emerged from their work, despite 
their more cautious approach to the creative process. To illustrate, Steven, who imposed 
constraints to create a sense of both control and trust in quality, recounted his interest and 
amazement when working with an algorithm that produced surprising output: 
With my Ph.D. student, [name], we sat down a couple of days, we devised an 
algorithm, we designed an algorithm, and we’re like, “Okay. Let’s see how it 
solves a robot navigation task,” without really having high hopes, right? So, we 
thought that if we gave it the ability of surprise, the robot, it would do interesting 
things, and it actually did wild, interesting things – sort of actually solved the 
problem much faster than if you give it a particular objective. …These are the 
moments that keep you going.  
 
Imposing constraints therefore does not seem incompatible with experiencing enjoyment, 
interest, and even thrill in surprises.  
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On the contrary, applying self-imposed constraints seemed to enable informants who felt 
responsible for negative outcomes to engage in their work more deeply than they would 
otherwise. Josh, who constrained the functionality of his creation, described meeting his goals to 
do “amazing” things with AI and to find solutions that would reduce fears: 
I think we are leaning toward that you can either be scared of this, or you can 
think, “I can improve the performance of this method and do something about the 
part that causes me to fear.” So if you ask a normal person, they will say that, “Oh 
it’s scary, I fear the implementation of the algorithm.” But for us who are doing 
research in this context, I think we are leaning toward, “Isn’t that amazing? Let’s 
work on that, let’s see how it works, and let’s improve the algorithm, and let’s 
find a solution.”  
 
Similarly, Jeremy explained, “I want to be part of this AI generation. But I also want to do it 
properly.” He achieved this dual goal by imposing constraints that created a sense of positive 
moral valence and control over his creation. Ellen, who imposed project choice constraints on 
her work, expressed her dedication to reaping the benefits of AI by moving forward “carefully 
and thoughtfully.” Self-imposed constraints therefore seemed to enable informants to address 
their concerns about the future of their work, reduce their amplified negative emotions, and 
ultimately feel more positive about their work.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
DISCUSSION, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Forecasting the future of one’s creation is an inherently “noisy” process, fraught with 
ambiguity and uncertainty (Byrne, Shipman, & Mumford, 2010). This dissertation explores this 
process in the context of AI development, in which individuals grapple with the negative 
downstream effects that could arise from implementing their work. My analysis indicates that, in 
a setting in which creative ideas have the potential to harm a large number of people, individuals 
forecast both positive and negative outcomes and experience ambivalence. They respond to this 
ambivalence in different ways, which have important implications for the creative process. The 
induced process model encompassing these relationships follows: 
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Forecasting 
positive and 
negative 
outcomes elicits 
ambivalence 
Cognitive: See 
potential to do both 
good and harm 
Emotional: Feel both 
excited and scared 
 
Commitment to 
work 
Acceptance of positive 
and negative outcomes 
Heedful creativity with self-
imposed constraints 
• Negative forecasted outcomes 
addressed  
o Self-imposed constraints elicit 
sense of positive moral valence, 
control, and/or quality of creation 
• Engagement in work enabled by self-
imposed constraints 
o Shift toward positive orientation  
o Exploration within self-
determined boundaries 
• Presence of constraints as reminder 
of possible negative outcomes 
Ambivalence response: 
Amplification of positive 
orientation 
Distancing from negative outcomes by: 
• Anchoring on present moment 
• Emphasizing positive outcomes 
Domination response to ambivalence 
Unconstrained creativity 
• Negative forecasted outcomes 
rendered irrelevant 
• Constraints seen as unnecessary or 
counterproductive 
• Engagement in work enabled by 
amplification of positive orientation 
 
Concretizing 
negative 
outcomes 
Envisioning 
negative 
outcomes in 
detail-oriented 
way increases 
sense of urgency 
and responsibility 
Ambivalence response: 
Redistribution 
Excitement 
about 
positive 
outcomes 
Temporary strengthening of 
negative orientation due to 
concretizing negative outcomes 
Positive orientation 
strengthens through use of  
self-imposed constraints 
Acceptance 
of positive 
outcomes 
manifests 
 in 
Acceptance 
of negative 
outcomes 
manifests in 
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Toward a Theory of Forecasting, Ambivalence, and Self-Imposed Constraints in the Creative 
Process 
To delineate my emergent theory of forecasting, ambivalence, and self-imposed 
constraints, in this section, I summarize my findings and discuss the theoretical insights that 
emerge from them. To begin, I find that in the context of potentially harmful creative work, 
forecasting, defined as predicting the outcomes of new ideas within particular settings (Kettner, 
Guilford, & Christensen, 1959; Wilson, Guilford, Christensen, & Lewis, 1954; Byrne, Shipman, 
& Mumford, 2010; Berg, 2016) elicits ambivalence. Following current research, I define 
ambivalence as “simultaneously positive and negative orientations toward an object” (Ashforth, 
Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014: 1454) – “orientations” refers to both thoughts and feelings, and 
in the present research, the “object” is individuals’ artificial intelligence (AI) creations, including 
their potential outcomes.6 Because individuals strive for consistency (Festinger, 1957; Heider, 
1958), ambivalence is an uncomfortable psychological state that individuals are naturally driven 
to address, which they may do in a number of ways, such as through the amplification of one 
orientation or through accepting both orientations (see Pratt & Pradies, 2011, and Ashforth, 
Rogers, Pratt, & Pradies, 2014, for overviews of different ambivalence responses). 
Though all informants discussed the potential positive effects of their work, they also 
discussed the harmful effects associated with implementing their creations. As informants 
forecasted both positive and negative outcomes, they experienced cognitive and emotional 
ambivalence: They considered the potential to do both good and harm through their work 
(cognitive ambivalence) and experienced a mixture of excitement and fear (emotional 
 
6 While ambivalence can vary in intensity and salience and is not always a conscious experience, my data speak to 
ambivalence that is at least moderately intense and salient to individuals. 
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ambivalence). However, informants responded to this ambivalence in different ways, which are 
associated with different ways of relating to forecasted outcomes and with the presence or 
absence of self-imposed constraints. 
One group of informants responded to ambivalence by anchoring on the present moment 
and/or the positive outcomes that they expected to emerge from their work. The former involves 
focusing on day-to-day work, while the latter entails emphasizing the importance of forecasted 
positive effects, despite potential costs that might be incurred. These informants created 
psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & Liberman, 2003) from forecasted negative 
outcomes and rendered them irrelevant to their work. These informants were enthusiastic about 
their day-to-day work and/or about precipitating positive outcomes through their work, and they 
perceived constraints as unnecessary or as impediments to their progress. As such, they 
proceeded without imposing constraints on their work.  
This pattern aligns with prior research on “domination” responses to ambivalence, which 
involve amplifying thoughts and feelings of one valence over those of the opposing valence 
(Harrist, 2006; Bell & Esses, 2002; Katz & Glass, 1979; Ashforth et al., 2014). My work 
indicates that, as creative workers distance themselves from the potential negative outcomes of 
implementing their creations, they absolve themselves of responsibility for the negative 
outcomes that they could precipitate. They thereby amplify their positive thoughts and feelings 
toward their work and see no need to constrain their work. My work further suggests that this 
amplification of positive thoughts and feelings supports engagement, defined as involvement, 
satisfaction, and enthusiasm (Harter, Schmidt, & Hayes, 2002), in potentially harmful creative 
work. This path therefore validates existing research on domination responses as enabling 
individuals to resolve their ambivalence (Baumeister, Dale, & Sommer, 1998; Bell & Esses, 
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2002; Katz & Glass, 1979) – and, when the positive orientation is emphasized, to move forward 
with the current plan of action without cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957; Harmon-Jones, 
Harmon-Jones, & Levy, 2015). Indeed, positive emotions are associated with a sense of progress 
toward achieving meaningful goals (Amabile & Kramer, 2011; Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 
1997; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The positive emotions that arise from individuals’ own creations 
likely convey a sense of moving in the “right direction,” propelling individuals to move forward 
with their idea development – without responding to forecasted consequences. Hence, the 
amplification of positive thoughts and feelings involves a dismissal of negative forecasted 
outcomes. This manifests in viewing constraints as unnecessary or counterproductive and 
moving forward without placing boundaries around the creative process or its outcomes. I 
therefore refer to this path as entailing “unconstrained creativity.” 
However, informants who concretized the potential negative outcomes of their work and 
employed self-imposed constraints – the majority of my sample (46 of 64) – exhibited a novel 
response to ambivalence, which I refer to as “redistribution.” These informants accepted the 
positive and negative outcomes that they forecasted as likely emerging from implementing their 
AI creations. They thereby exhibited commitment to their work, defined as binding together 
positive and negative orientations through choice (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; 
Pratt & Pradies, 2011). Following this conceptualization, commitment stabilizes human behavior 
(e.g., continue working in AI development) when an individual might otherwise be driven to 
behave differently (e.g., leave AI development and pursue other work). Commitment may be 
seen as having two “faces” (Brickman, 1987), in that the positive or negative orientation may, at 
times, be more salient to the individual, depending on the situation.  
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In the present case, informants’ commitment manifested in both their excitement about 
the potential positive outcomes of their work and their concern about potential adverse effects. 
They faced the seemingly conflicting motivations to move forward in their work while 
confronting its potential consequences. Informants achieved this two-sided goal of embracing the 
positive aspects of their work while taking responsibility for forecasted negative outcomes by 
imposing constraints on their work, which enabled them to explore freely within self-determined 
boundaries. I refer to this process as a “redistribution” of ambivalence because this combination 
of commitment and self-imposed constraints seems to enable a shift from an intensification of 
negative thoughts and feelings toward a strengthening of positive thoughts and feelings. Below, I 
describe each step in this induced process. 
Though individuals may be simultaneously excited and worried about the range of 
possible outcomes of their work, negative thoughts and emotions tend to be more impactful on 
behavior than positive thoughts and emotions (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 
2001). As such, redistribution entails first a strengthening of the negative orientation. Informants 
concretized the negative outcomes of their work – that is, they envisioned potential adverse 
effects in a detail-oriented way, which seemed to temporarily amplify negative thoughts and 
feelings. By rendering abstract fears concrete, concretizing appears to transform fears into 
seemingly known consequences, reducing psychological distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003) to negative outcomes and motivating action (Liberman, Trope, McCrea, & 
Sherman, 2008; McCrea, Liberman, Trope, & Sherman, 2008) to address them. Two 
mechanisms likely drive this effect. First, as noted above, more concrete construals of objects 
and events are associated with a reduction of psychological distance (Liberman, Trope, & 
Stephan, 2007), which drives individuals to take action. Second, negative emotions tend to arise 
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when envisioning negative outcomes (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984), and individuals are 
naturally driven to reduce negative emotions (Taylor et al., 1998; Elster, 1999; Lazarus, 2001; 
Lazarus & Lazarus, 1994). As concretizing triggers a temporary, relative amplification of 
negative thoughts and feelings, this seems to exert an important influence on behavior: 
Individuals may shift into the analytical, critical-thinking mode that arises from negative 
emotions, prompting a reevaluation of the current plan of action (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; 
Schwarz, 2011). In the context of potentially harmful creative work, this manifests as taking 
responsibility for the potential negative outcomes of implementing one’s creation, as individuals 
are compelled to reduce perceived risks and thereby alleviate their negative emotions. 
My work suggests that, because these negative thoughts and feelings are tied to creative 
workers’ own creations – projects over which they have some degree of psychological ownership 
(Rouse, 2016; Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Pierce, Kostova, & Dirks, 2001, 2003) and in whose future 
they are invested – creative workers reevaluate the current plan of action by imposing constraints 
on their own work. Self-imposed constraints manifest as boundaries around the creative process 
or its outcomes, and they provide a sense of reducing the likelihood of forecasted negative 
outcomes. Individuals who apply such constraints seem to feel that they have taken responsibility 
for the potential negative outcomes of their work – that they have “paid their dues” – and may 
therefore engage in their work within these self-determined boundaries.  
The redistribution response builds on – but ultimately differs from – commitment as a 
response to ambivalence (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011). 
With the redistribution response, individuals accept the positive and negative sides of their work, 
but unlike commitment (or other “holism” responses, Ashforth et al., 2014), positive and 
negative thoughts and feelings are not equally dominant. Rather, this response redistributes – or 
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shifts the relative strength of – positive and negative thoughts and feelings. Through the 
application of self-imposed constraints, the temporary strengthening of negative thoughts and 
feelings elicited by concretizing negative outcomes shifts toward a strengthening of positive 
thoughts and feelings. Yet neither orientation is eliminated entirely during this process; both are 
important to the story.  
My categorization of self-imposed constraints indicates that each type of constraint may 
serve one of three purposes: eliciting a sense of positive moral valence (constrain project choice), 
control over one’s creation (constrain functionality and/or require full understanding), or trust in 
the quality of one’s creation (constrain input, own reactions, and/or release process). 
Implementing constraints with these purposes seems to enable individuals to manage the 
negative, fear-based emotions that arise through concretizing the potential negative outcomes of 
their work. To explain further, if individuals believe that their creations have a positive moral 
valence – that creations are inherently good or safe – this alleviates fears that one’s creation 
could be used in dangerous ways. If individuals use constraints in service of maintaining full 
control over their creations, this reduces the fear that their creations could harm the general 
public, either directly (dangerous applications, malfunctioning creation) or indirectly (job 
displacement), because they trust that they – or other humans – will maintain oversight and play 
a role in the AI’s behavior. Finally, if individuals forecast risks associated with releasing a 
malfunctioning creation and constrain their work to increase its quality, this builds trust that the 
creation will be a positive contribution to the world due to its robustness as a tool, sometimes 
regardless of human involvement in its functionality.  
Taken together, these processes show how individuals may respond to their ambivalence 
about their potentially harmful creations by shifting the valence of their thoughts and feelings 
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(from more negative to more positive) through the use of self-imposed constraints. Self-imposed 
constraints seem to enable individuals to feel less ambivalent about their work and to engage in 
the creative process with enthusiasm and openness – within the boundaries of the constraint. 
Hence, individuals may persist in potentially harmful creative work while taking responsibility 
for risks. The redistribution response may therefore enable even highly concerned individuals to 
reap the psychological benefits of engaging in creative work, such as enjoyment, thrill, and 
fascination.  
Yet the application of constraints also serves as a reminder of the possible negative 
future, should individuals decide to stop constraining their work. Informants recognized their 
critical role in ensuring that certain boundaries were implemented and maintained. Indeed, 
because such constraints are consciously self-imposed, individuals are likely aware of the threat 
that would reemerge without them. As such, self-imposed constraints do not resolve ambivalence 
entirely. Rather than eliminating negative thoughts and feelings altogether, self-imposed 
constraints may quell concerns and enable individuals to enjoy their work, shifting from one 
“face” of commitment (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011) to 
another. Yet the presence of self-imposed constraints serves as a reminder of the negative 
outcomes that could emerge without them: As long as self-imposed constraints are used, the 
positive face of commitment may face forward. As such, redistribution may be considered a 
response to ambivalence rather than a way of resolving ambivalence. 
Because self-imposed constraints seem to enable individuals to move forward in their 
work while responding to the negative outcomes that they forecast, I refer to this path as 
involving “heedful creativity.” My work builds on prior research on heedful behavior, defined as 
approaching situations with greater care, critical thinking, and conscientiousness (Ryle, 1949; 
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Weick & Roberts, 1993). Hence, the notion of “heed” describes a particular intention behind 
behaviors. Whereas habitual behaviors replicate past actions, heedful behaviors arise from an 
openness to continual learning and involve a responsiveness to the full range of outcomes that 
could emerge in a given situation, such as potential adverse effects. Heedfulness enables 
individuals to counteract the natural tendency to resist change once one has decided to pursue a 
particular plan of action (e.g., Brickman, Perloff, & Seligman, 1987; Brehm & Leventhal, 1962; 
Thibaut & Ross, 1969; Walster & Prestholdt, 1966). In settings that require ongoing alertness, 
heedfulness plays an important role in ensuring that operations run smoothly and that risks are 
appropriately addressed, which ultimately reduces organizational errors (Weick & Roberts, 
1993). My work therefore translates the notion of heedfulness into the domain of potentially 
harmful creativity, showing how heedfulness manifests in the application of self-imposed 
constraints. 
A note on self-imposed constraints and creative performance. Though the primary goal 
of this work is to show how forecasting and ambivalence influence the creative process rather 
than to evaluate creative outcomes, my analysis of the different types of constraints that 
informants imposed on their work provides tentative insights regarding how such constraints 
may support creativity. Building on prior research that shows how heedfulness enables 
individuals to attain better outcomes (Weick & Roberts, 1993), my work suggests that self-
imposed constraints may support creative performance in two key ways.  
Project choice, input, and functionality constraints themselves require creativity; 
informants developed novel ways of meeting the technical challenges before them as they 
worked within the boundaries set by these three constraints. As such, these constraints may be 
seen as redefining the problem or task criteria. To begin, project choice constraints manifested as 
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moving away from projects for which individuals forecasted dangerous applications and toward 
projects that seemed inherently good or safe. Some informants made this move with the intent of 
focusing on a narrow range of subsequent research questions that they perceived as essential to 
developing safer AI. For instance, Brian explained that, though he could have “gone in many 
types of directions in AI,” he funneled his passions for understanding human intelligence and 
creating AI into projects that would put “humans first.” Motivated by this “continual thrust,” he 
developed tools with the intention of augmenting and empowering humans, rather than 
competing with or replacing them. His work has resulted in one of the most ubiquitous “virtual 
assistants” currently in use. Similarly, Adam recounted constraining his project choice to focus 
specifically on developing AI safety techniques. He harnessed his fascination with “digging into 
really complicated, interesting, intellectual ideas” to tackle some of the most challenging 
research questions facing AI today, including ensuring that AIs act ethically. Constraining 
project choice may, on its surface, seem like an inherent reduction of creativity in its diminishing 
of the pool of ideas that one may consider. However, project choice constraints may drive 
creative performance by harnessing individuals’ intrinsic motivation, domain-relevant skills, and 
creative thinking skills and applying them to challenging problems that individuals feel 
passionate about solving.  
Constraining input, a quality constraint, manifested most often as developing creative 
ways of addressing the dilemma of biased AI. Informants explained that, although AI itself is 
neutral, it receives data from humans, and humans are biased. Informants acknowledged that 
eliminating bias altogether may not be possible; Greg predicted, “There’s always going to be 
bias.” Nonetheless, they viewed this as a challenging technical problem. For instance, Ray said, 
“[Bias] is actually a problem that we can probably solve technically. Once we recognize that this 
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is happening, we can make sure that it doesn’t happen, or improve the system. So that’s 
something where AI researchers can be aware of that and make a difference.” Informants 
described finding clever ways of reducing bias in their creations, such as through developing 
code that made it easier to locate and reduce bias. One informant, Harry, noted that although bias 
reduction techniques often produce bottlenecks that slow down the AI, his AI actually performed 
more efficiently after incorporating his novel bias-targeting function. Hence, constraining input 
is itself a challenging problem that requires creativity, and the solutions that individuals develop 
may yield AIs that are not only less biased but also perform more efficiently than expected. 
The control constraint of restricting the functionality of the creation also calls for creative 
ideas, as informants needed to determine how and when to require human involvement or 
otherwise “safeguard” the AI by narrowing its range of behaviors. Like project choice and input 
constraints, constraining functionality is not straightforward; as Caleb said regarding the 
controllability of AI creations, “There’s this huge debate…in AI about how we do it.” Informants 
nonetheless came up with innovative ways of developing their creations while restricting their 
functionality. Kyle described finding a technique to limit the speed with which his robot moved 
so that it would not move in a dangerous way when humans were nearby. Bruce discussed 
coming up with a data-efficient technique that combined human involvement with sophisticated 
safety criteria to limit his swarm robots’ behaviors, depending on characteristics of the 
environment, to reduce adverse effects. Finally, Alan recounted his evolution toward 
“engineering slowness” into his game design AI and building in a negotiation process between 
the AI and the human. He concluded, “It’s made every aspect of the system better, and it’s also 
pointed to ways that I can make healthier AI systems in the future,” and he described his plan to 
develop additional systems that depended on humans.  
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Though constraining project choice, input, and functionality redefine the task criteria and 
drive individuals to take on particular challenges, the three remaining constraints – constraining 
own reactions, requiring a full understanding, and constraining the release process – may relate 
to creative outcomes in a different way. These constraints may benefit creativity by catalyzing 
the development of domain-relevant skills (Amabile, 1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). 
Domain-relevant skills involve subject matter expertise and technical skills, and they play an 
essential role during the task preparation and validation stages of the creative process (Amabile, 
1983, 1988; Amabile & Pratt, 2016; Hirst, Van Knippenberg, & Zhou, 2009). Informants who 
constrained their reactions described learning to respond to positive results with doubt (Gary), 
trying not to “overestimate the positives” (Nelson), and having a healthy skepticism of “black 
boxes” in AI creations (Daniel). Constraining their reactions prompted them to double-check 
their work and to develop a better understanding of their creations. Informants who required a 
full understanding of their creations before moving forward with implementation spoke of 
“making the internals of the model more clear” (Gary), understanding their creations’ 
“shortcomings” and “weaknesses” (Alan), and getting “more insight into what our current agents 
are actually doing” (Adam), which they deemed one of the major challenges of working with AI. 
Finally, informants who constrained their release process described “pilot[ing] tools on ourselves 
first” (George), testing new AIs on “edge cases” (i.e., unusual situations; Christopher), learning 
to “evaluate what’s good enough” (Richard) regarding the AI’s output, and working toward 
making creations “more correct” (Nelson). Though motivated by concern regarding possible 
adverse effects, these constraints propelled informants to learn more about how their creations 
worked and to enhance their domain skills. Because these constraints directly develop 
individuals’ expertise, they likely support creative outcomes by boosting creative performance 
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on subsequent tasks. Those who did not constrain their work, by contrast, sometimes described 
enjoying not knowing what was going on inside the “black box” of their AI creations. As such, 
holding all other factors equal, their creative performance would likely be lower in comparison 
to those who developed their domain skills due to their constraints.   
Contributions and Future Research 
This research makes several important theoretical contributions and opens up a number of 
avenues for future work. Below, I describe how this work sheds light on forecasting, 
ambivalence, and self-imposed constraints in creative work. I also discuss how my work aligns 
with and adds nuance to research on psychological distance and construal level. In addition, I 
discuss opportunities for future research. As an inductive, qualitative study that is focused on one 
domain of creative work, the strength of this project is in its deep exploration of particular 
theoretical dynamics in a specific context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1990). Future research is 
needed to test the theoretical relationships that I have induced and to explore the questions that 
arise from the contributions that I make.  
Forecasting and creativity. One major contribution of this work is revealing how 
forecasting the outcomes of implementation may influence the creative process. Research on 
creativity has long emphasized the importance of the open exploration of ideas rather than being 
overly focused on outcomes (e.g., Amabile, 1979). However, in potentially harmful creative 
work, the possibility of precipitating adverse effects through implementing new ideas creates a 
tension that individuals must manage. This dissertation indicates that considering outcomes does 
indeed influence how creative work proceeds, but not only through increasing or decreasing 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., Amabile, 1979, 1985): The vast majority of individuals in my sample 
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spoke of their deep enjoyment of their work, yet some were clearly more focused on how they 
could prevent potential negative outcomes than others.  
My work indicates that, in the context of potentially harmful creativity, creative 
forecasting is not only a process of predicting whether ideas will be successful, as prior work has 
emphasized (e.g., Runco & Smith, 1992; Berg, 2016); it also involves considering the outcomes 
of implementing one’s work, which may include both positive and negative effects. I find that 
forecasting the outcomes of implementation elicits emotional reactions that relate to whether and 
how individuals constrain their work in the present moment. Hence, forecasting may extend 
beyond considering whether task criteria will be satisfied (e.g., Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 
2004) to include weighing the possible downstream effects of satisfying those criteria – of 
implementing a creative idea. This process may catalyze individuals to rethink their work 
altogether, such as by driving them to reject certain projects, to place boundaries on the 
functionality of what they are creating, or to build extra checks into the release process. Indeed, 
forecasting downstream effects may lead individuals to redefine the task criteria themselves, 
such as by changing the underlying purpose of their work. At a more general level, by showing 
how forecasting downstream effects seems to impact how creative workers engage with the task 
before them, this dissertation helps to build a bridge between creativity and innovation research: 
Creative workers, particularly when faced with the possibility of highly negative downstream 
effects, may make decisions in the present based on how they relate to the consequences of 
implementing their work. 
 Ambivalence and creativity. Though I did not enter the field searching for ambivalence, 
“mixed feelings” (excitement coupled with significant concerns) – associated with forecasting 
“mixed outcomes” – were prevalent in my data. In hindsight, this forecasting of mixed outcomes 
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makes sense; even in low-risk situations, forecasting may not result in a singular forecasted 
outcome – Byrne and colleagues (2010: 120) describe forecasting as “a complex form of 
prediction where neither predictors nor outcomes are ﬁxed.” My data suggest that, in the context 
of potentially harmful creative work, negative outcomes often seem just as likely as positive 
ones, and forecasting both positive and negative outcomes elicits ambivalence, defined as 
positive and negative thoughts and feelings (Pratt & Pradies, 2011; Ashforth, Rogers, Pratt, & 
Pradies, 2014), toward one’s work. 
Because creativity is vulnerable to the influences of affective states (Kaufmann, 2003; 
Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Amabile & Pratt, 2016), it is important to understand how 
ambivalence affects creative work, yet extant research on ambivalence and creativity is scant. 
Fong’s (2006) series of laboratory experiments indicate that ambivalence may benefit creativity 
by enabling individuals to develop novel associations. George and Zhou’s (2007) field study of 
employees in an oil field services company suggests that, in a supportive context, experiencing 
both positive and negative moods may drive the divergent thinking (positive moods) and more 
focused, critical thinking (negative moods) that are both necessary for developing novel and 
useful ideas. However, Fong’s work manipulated emotional ambivalence prior to – and which 
was unrelated to – the creative task at hand, and George and Zhou’s study evaluated affect at 
work using the classic Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) and also did not relate affect to individuals’ own work output. 
By showing how ambivalence may be elicited by one’s own creation and how this 
impacts the creative process, this dissertation also makes a major contribution to understanding 
the relationship between ambivalence and creativity. I show that, depending on how individuals 
respond to ambivalence about the positive and negative outcomes of implementing their 
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creations, they may choose whether to impose boundaries on their work, which may affect 
aspects of the ideas that they develop as well as the process by which they develop and release 
them.  
I show that, first of all, in the context of potentially harmful creative work, the 
“domination” response (Ashforth et al., 2014) of amplifying (Harrist, 2006; Bell & Esses, 2002; 
Katz & Glass, 1979) positive thoughts and feelings about one’s creation is associated with 
moving forward in one’s work without constraints. Hence, amplification of the positive 
orientation reduces emotional and cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and seems to support 
engagement in the creative process. However, it may come at the cost of paying heed to 
legitimate risks.  
A more cautious approach to potentially harmful creativity manifests in the novel 
“redistribution” response, which involves excitement about realizing positive outcomes through 
one’s work combined with a deep concern regarding negative outcomes. In a context in which 
individuals have some degree of psychological ownership (Pierce & Jussila, 2011; Pierce, 
Kostova, & Dirks, 2001, 2003) over their creations and are invested in the outcomes of 
implementation, these experiences appear to drive individuals to constrain their own work in 
various ways. Imposing constraints seems to shift an intensification of negative thoughts and 
feelings toward a strengthening of positive thoughts and feelings. Redistribution therefore builds 
on – but differs from – the commitment response to ambivalence (Brickman et al., 1987; Pratt & 
Rosa, 2003; Pratt & Pradies, 2011), which involves accepting both positive and negative 
orientations through choosing a particular object or action. To illustrate the commitment 
response, Brickman (1987) used the example of marriage, which involves choosing to be with a 
particular person whom one loves – at the cost of pursuing relationships with others. Hence, the 
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notion of constraint is embedded in the commitment response, though Brickman did not 
emphasize this concept. By choosing to commit to one person, individuals accept both the 
positive and negative side of this arrangement. With the redistribution response, individuals 
commit to their work in accepting its positive and negative aspects, but concretizing negative 
outcomes seems to compel individuals to impose constraints on their work, which enables a shift 
toward positive thoughts and feelings. However, the negative orientation is not eliminated 
entirely through self-imposed constraints; the presence of such consciously-imposed boundaries 
seems to remind individuals of the harm that could arise from their work without them.  
Negative emotions are associated with a narrowing of focus (Fredrickson & Branigan, 
2005) that has sometimes been shown to adversely affect creative performance (Fredrickson, 
1998, 2001; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). Insofar as negative emotions 
adversely affect creativity, self-imposed constraints that address an amplification of negative 
thoughts and feelings may enable individuals to “recover” their creativity. Though driven by 
prospective thought processes, self-imposed constraints seem to enable individuals to engage 
more fully in the present-moment activities of exploration and invention by arming them with a 
sense of safe exploration.  
Constraints and creativity. This work also makes an important contribution to theory on 
the role of constraints in creative work. I show that a variety of self-imposed constraints enable 
individuals to manage the concern, fear, and guilt that emerge when concretizing the negative 
outcomes that may arise from their creations. Much earlier research on constraints presents a 
largely negative perspective, focusing on how externally-imposed constraints may be detrimental 
to creativity (e.g., Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993; Amabile, 1983, 1988, 1996). As an 
example, Woodman and colleagues (1993) defined task, time, and other resource constraints as 
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inhibitors of creativity and placed constraints conceptually in opposition to creativity enhancers. 
Amabile (1988) revealed how certain types of extrinsic constraints, such as features of the social 
environment that are perceived as controlling individual behavior, can impede individuals’ sense 
of freedom and autonomy (Deci, 1971, 1972; Deci & Ryan, 2002; Ryan & Deci, 2000) and 
reduce intrinsic motivation, ultimately adversely affecting creativity. Much research has shown 
that various types of externally-imposed constraints reduce creativity by curtailing engagement 
in the creative process (e.g., Amabile, DeJong, & Lepper, 1976; Amabile & Gitomer, 1984; 
Byron, Khazanchi, & Nazarian, 2010; Rosso, 2014). However, another stream of research has 
shown how particular types of externally-imposed constraints, such as requiring the inclusion of 
a particular function or feature (e.g., Finke, 1990), improve creative performance (Finke, 1990; 
Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) by counteracting the natural tendency to fall back on familiar 
responses (Ward, 1994; Bornstein & D’Agostino, 1992; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984; Schwarz, 
Bless, Strack, Klumpp, Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Hence, though externally-imposed constraints that reduce autonomy tend to adversely impact 
creative performance, externally-imposed constraints on content may serve as inputs that 
stimulate creative thinking. 
 More recently, researchers have begun to integrate different types of constraints into 
more unified frameworks, which help make sense of the differential effects that different types of 
constraints may have on creative work (e.g., Rosso, 2014; Cromwell, Amabile, & Harvey, 2018; 
Cromwell, 2018; Acar, Tarakci, & van Knippenberg, 2019). In Table 1, I categorized the 
constraints that I have induced in terms of the purpose they seemed to serve for the informants in 
my sample. The frameworks proposed by Cromwell and colleagues (2018) and Rosso (2014) 
offer particularly useful lenses through which to understand the types of constraints that I have 
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induced and to highlight the contributions that I make. For Cromwell and colleagues (2018), 
“resource constraints” are similar to Rosso’s (2014) “process constraints,” in that these 
constraints limit the resources or processes used to generate ideas; these encompass constraints 
that have historically been seen as detrimental to creativity by reducing individuals’ ability to 
engage in creative work. Cromwell and colleagues’ (2018) “problem constraints” align 
somewhat with Rosso’s (2014) “product constraints” and reflect how problems – and resulting 
creative ideas – are influenced by particular goals, such as for novelty and usefulness. Although 
the constraints I have induced do not map perfectly onto these two categories, Table 2 
categorizes the constraints I have induced by integrating elements of these two frameworks. 
Additionally, I note the stages of the creative process during which they take place.  
Table 2: Self-Imposed Constraints Categorized in Terms of Problem, Process, and Product 
Constraints 
Problem Constraint Constraining Project 
Choicea 
  
Process Constraints Constraining Own 
Reactionsb 
Constraining Release 
Processd 
Requiring Full 
Understandingd 
Product Constraints Constraining Inputb,c Constraining 
Functionalityc 
 
Notes. I maintain the color scheme used in Table 1, which reflects the induced purpose of each constraint (green: 
positive moral valence; blue: control; light red: quality).  
a Problem/task identification stage 
b Idea validation stage 
c Idea elaboration stage 
d After outcome assessment stage 
 
Although prior work on beneficial constraints has shown that extrinsic problem or 
product constraints may benefit idea generation (Finke, 1990; Finke et al., 1992; see Cromwell, 
2018), this dissertation offers a different perspective, showing how multiple types of constraints 
– both problem/product and process – may be used proactively to manage the cognitive and 
emotional challenges of potentially harmful creativity. In this sense, constraints may – perhaps 
paradoxically – be enabling: I show that, when negative thoughts and emotions are amplified by 
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concretizing potential negative downstream effects, there are multiple pathways toward feeling 
that one has taken responsibility and may move forward: Individuals may impose constraints on 
their own work at early, middle, and later stages of the creative process to address the types of 
negative outcomes that they forecast and to redistribute their ambivalence.  
My findings regarding the role of self-imposed constraints in the creative process point to 
fruitful ground for future research. First of all, future research should test the relationships that I 
have induced, including whether self-imposed constraints do indeed support engagement in 
potentially harmful creative work by addressing ambivalence – and whether this impacts creative 
outcomes. As already mentioned, prior research indicates that externally-imposed constraints 
may adversely affect creativity by reducing autonomy and intrinsic motivation; it may be that 
self-imposed constraints benefit creativity not only by quelling negative emotions, but also by 
protecting autonomy. Given that self-imposed constraints cannot be manipulated directly, 
correlational field data is needed to test how self-imposed constraints influence the creative 
worker during the creative process. With such data, researchers should of course measure and 
control for individual differences that may affect creative performance, such as intrinsic 
motivation (e.g., Amabile, 1979, 1985).  
Future research is also needed to determine whether the different types of self-imposed 
constraints that I have induced differentially impact creative performance, and if so, how they do 
so. As already noted, though my dissertation focuses on how forecasting and ambivalence 
influence the creative process, my work indicates that different types of constraints may support 
creativity in different ways: Constraints on project choice, input, and functionality require 
individuals to come up with novel ideas to satisfy the revised task criteria (i.e., working within 
the boundaries of the constraint). Constraining own reactions, requiring a full understanding, and 
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constraining the release process likely support the development of domain-relevant skills. 
Though these insights are tentative, my work indicates that, in addition to helping individuals 
manage the challenging thoughts and emotions that arise in potentially harmful creative work, 
self-imposed constraints may also support creative performance.  
However, these ideas should be tested, and the precise mechanisms by which different 
types of self-imposed constraints affect creative outcomes should be explored. The constraints 
that I have induced may be categorized along a number of dimensions (e.g., problem/product vs. 
process, early-stage vs. late-stage), each of which may be an important source of variance in 
terms of how they impact creative performance. For example, the early-stage constraint on 
project choice reduces the pool of ideas that individuals are willing to explore and thereby 
directly affects idea generation. Later-stage constraints, such as on the release process, may 
follow a more open idea generation process. Though later-stage constraints may not affect idea 
generation directly, they may have an indirect effect on idea generation by leaving 
uncomfortable emotional experiences unaddressed. That is, when potential negative outcomes 
are salient and negative thoughts and feelings are amplified, the stage at which this amplification 
is reduced may influence creative performance, given the importance of positive affect for idea 
generation (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Amabile & Pratt, 2016). Because self-imposed 
constraints that are applied earlier in the creative process would presumably reduce negative 
emotions more quickly, such early-stage constraints might improve creative performance as 
compared with later-stage constraints. However, if planning to implement a constraint curtails 
negative emotions, later-stage self-imposed constraints might result in the highest creative 
performance by enabling open idea generation and diminishing negative emotions. Experience-
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sampling methods would be useful in teasing out the nuances of the emotions and thought 
processes that take place, depending on the type of constraint involved. 
A broader question emerges when considering that creativity sometimes calls for being 
comfortable with social disapproval and running against existing norms (Baucus, Norton, 
Baucus, & Human 2008; Kelley & Littman, 2001). If social norms emerge around constraints, 
such that certain constraints are no longer self-imposed but become expected, the types of 
constraints that I have observed as enabling engagement in the creative process might reduce 
creativity because they have become institutionalized and challenge individual autonomy. 
Qualitative methods would be helpful to explore the impact of the institutionalization of 
previously-self-imposed constraints. If self-imposed constraints eventually become externally 
imposed and begin to quell individual creativity, a provocative question arises: Do the benefits of 
feeling that creations are safe outweigh the risks of limiting individual creativity? 
It is also important to better understand what drives certain individuals to constrain their 
work when forecasting potential positive and negative outcomes and experiencing ambivalence. 
Informants who amplified their positive thoughts and feelings may have been driven to protect 
their intrinsic enjoyment of their work, perhaps viewing constraints as a threat to this enjoyment. 
Informants who imposed constraints on their work, though, seemed more driven by prosocial and 
moral concerns. These informants also expressed the belief that they could effect change through 
their work – that imposing constraints would affect the future of their work and perhaps the 
future of AI more broadly. It is likely that individual differences play an important role in 
whether individuals respond to ambivalence by imposing constraints. Future research should 
explore prosocial motivation, which involves concern for others’ wellbeing (Batson, 1987); 
moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002), which is associated with imagining potential 
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consequences and devising alternative courses of action (Johnson, 1993; Narvaez & Mrkva, 
2014; Werhane, 1999; Whitaker & Godwin, 2013; Keem, Shalley, Kim, & Jeong, 2018); and 
self-efficacy, or a sense of one’s ability to achieve desired outcomes (Bandura, 1977, 1982), as 
influencing whether individuals are likely to impose constraints on their potentially harmful 
creative work. It may also be the case that there are subtle differences in motivational processes 
driving the different types of constraints that I have induced. For instance, constraints that create 
a sense of positive moral valence may be more motivated by a strong sense of prosocial 
motivation and moral identity, whereas constraints that create a sense of control may be more 
motivated by a strong sense of self-efficacy. Future research is needed to parse out these 
nuances. 
Contextual factors may also play an important role in informing these processes. For 
instance, some organizations may prioritize developing cutting-edge techniques, whereas others 
may be oriented toward developing new technologies with caution. Although an organization-
level analysis is beyond the scope of the present research, I found – perhaps surprisingly – that 
those imposing constraints on their work spread fairly evenly across task types (e.g., academic 
research and consumer product development). Though the sample size is small, this absence of a 
clear pattern is likely due to the newness of AI and the current lack of norms for responding to 
perceived risks. An important area for future research is to identify organization-level factors that 
influence how individuals respond to ambivalence about the potential outcomes of their work. 
Indeed, even subtle contextual changes, such as wording, can influence individuals’ attitudes and 
motivational processes (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007). 
Psychological distance and construal level. Aspects of the processes that I have induced 
complement and extend theory on psychological distance and construal level. Informants who 
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anchored on the present moment and/or emphasized positive outcomes created psychological 
distance (Lewin, 1951; Trope & Liberman, 2003) between their own work and potential negative 
outcomes, which seemed to enable them to move forward without constraints. Some informants 
created this psychological distance by reasoning that they should focus on the technical details of 
their work and that implementing constraints was not part of their role. By displacing 
responsibility to others, these informants were able to proceed without constraints, without 
apparent conflict. For other informants, psychological distance arose from reasoning that 
negative outcomes would be so far away that they were simply not relevant to their own day-to-
day work; these individuals created psychological distance based on the forecasted temporal 
distance of potential threats. Concretizing, by contrast, involved envisioning negative effects in a 
detail-oriented way, which reduced informants’ psychological distance through creating a more 
intricate and grounded construal of outcomes (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007). 
I show how individuals may, by either distancing or concretizing, impact the 
psychological distance that they perceive when forecasting the detrimental outcomes of their 
own work, which relates to the role of self-imposed constraints in their work. I also reveal one 
way that these processes unfold in real-world settings. My findings suggest that in creative work, 
concretizing has to do with seeing the potential of what an idea could become, and through this 
process, the potential downstream effects of ideas become more concrete, which seems to give 
rise to a sense of urgency and responsibility for forecasted negative outcomes. Distancing, by 
contrast, can take place through focusing on one’s day-to-day work or by creating a sense of 
temporal distance from forecasted negative outcomes, both of which seem to reduce individuals’ 
sense of responsibility for negative outcomes.  
 94 
As a brief final point, my finding that concretizing outcomes leads to the use of 
constraints suggests that there may be a boundary condition to prior research indicating that more 
concrete construals are associated with self-control failures (Fujita, Trope, Liberman, & Levin-
Sagi, 2006; Fujita, 2008). Fujita and colleagues’ (2006) studies indicate that inducing a high-
level construal reduces the tendency to choose immediate rewards over delayed gratification – a 
marker of poor self-control (e.g., Ainslie, 1975; Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; 
Thaler, 1991) – as well as to forgo discomfort, when discomfort could bring about a positive 
distal outcome. These studies also suggest that when individuals apply low-level construals, by 
contrast, they fail to exert self-control. My work indicates that, when construals involve the 
potential adverse effects of one’s own work on other people, thinking in more concrete terms 
motivates individuals to exert control over their own actions by imposing constraints on their 
work. 
Conclusion 
This research provides novel insights into the experiences and processes involved in 
potentially harmful creative work, focusing on the domain of artificial intelligence (AI). This 
work illuminates the process by which creative workers choose whether to constrain their work 
based on how they respond to the emotions elicited by forecasting the outcomes of implementing 
their creations. In addition to responding to the call for research to explore how individuals 
developing AI think about the future of their work (Amabile, 2019), this dissertation may help 
individuals involved in any type of potentially harmful creativity to better understand the 
experiences and processes underlying their work. I show that forecasting affects decisions made 
during the creative process, which can drastically reshape the types and qualities of ideas that 
individuals develop and the process by which they are developed.  
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Organizations should recognize that individuals working on potentially harmful creative 
projects, such as AI, cloning, and gene editing, are likely experiencing ambivalence – and may 
be inventing the standards as they go. Organizations should therefore evaluate whether 
employees’ constraint decisions align with organizational goals. Further, organizations may be 
able to encourage employees to become more heedful, such as by providing opportunities for 
employees to reflect on potential consequences and how they might constrain their work to 
address them.  
Additionally, given that redistribution may be considered an ambivalence response rather 
than a resolution, my work also suggests that some individuals’ ability to manage their 
ambivalence may hinge on their ongoing ability to impose constraints on their work. If 
individuals concretize negative outcomes, but the context prohibits self-imposed constraints, this 
would likely leave negative thoughts and emotions amplified. Under such conditions, individuals 
would be challenged to reduce their negative thoughts and feelings in other ways, which could 
result in abandoning their work and leaving the organization. Hence, organizations engaged in 
potentially harmful creative work should take stock of their employees’ emotional experiences 
and constraint preferences, not only to see whether they align with organizational goals, but also 
to address the possibility of turnover.  
Finally, my work contributes to an emerging discussion about the risks of unconstrained 
creativity (e.g., Harrison & Wagner, 2016). To date, the vast majority of creativity research has 
looked for ways to unleash creativity by encouraging individuals to think “outside the box” 
(Guilford, 1967, 1968, 1982; Runco, 2010; Simonton, 1999; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Gino & 
Ariely, 2012). Indeed, much research on creativity has uncovered how external constraints, such 
as excessive bureaucracy, a lack of support for creativity, time pressure, and insufficient 
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resources, hamper individual creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1988). However, as work has shifted 
away from highly bureaucratic settings that ask employees to engage in rote tasks toward 
increasingly boundaryless settings that are dominated by knowledge work (Boland & Tenkasi, 
1995; Adler, 2001; Barley & Kunda, 2006; Powell & Snellman, 2004), it may be necessary to 
consider how particular types of boundaries are, under certain conditions, not only helpful but 
necessary. I show how, in the context of potentially harmful creative work, thinking “inside the 
box” may have emotional benefits in enabling individuals to approach their work more heedfully 
– in addition to, ideally, protecting humans from those harms. 
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Appendix I: Semi-Structured Interview Protocol for Pilot Interviews 
 
A. Background Information [part of interview only if not yet obtained] 
1. What is your educational background?  
2. What is your professional background? 
3. How long have you been at [organization]? 
4. What is your role at [organization]?  
 
B. Daily Work Experiences and Problem Solving 
1. What are your current projects? 
2. How do you decide what machine learning techniques to use? 
3. What sorts of challenges typically come up in your work? 
a. How do you problem-solve or troubleshoot?  
4. [Based on experiences described above] How do you come up with ideas when problem-
solving or troubleshooting?  
a. How automatic is this process for you?  
b. Does emotion play a role in this process?  
c. Do you ever reflect on human processes to give you ideas for what may improve 
the model?  
d. Could you describe a time when you felt like you were being creative or 
innovative in solving a problem? 
 
C. AI-Human Comparisons 
1. What do you see as the similarities and differences between artificial intelligence and 
human intelligence? 
2. How do you see the boundary between the AI tools you’re building and the individuals 
who use them? 
a. In other words, what does the AI accomplish, and what is left to the person, if 
anything? 
b. What is the logic behind this? 
3. Do you reflect on your own mental processes while working? If so, how? 
4. Does working with an AI ever change the way you think about how the human mind 
works? If so, how? 
 
D. Emotional Experiences and Complexity 
1. Could you tell me about a time when you had an emotional reaction while working? 
a. What did you do with that (those) feeling(s)? How did you move forward? 
b. How often does this happen?  
2. Have you experienced other emotional reactions in your work? Could you describe them? 
a. What did you do with that (those) feeling(s)? How did you move forward? 
b. How often does this happen?  
3. To what extent do you feel that you fully understand what you are creating?  
a. Do you think about this as you do your work? If so, what emotion(s) tend to come 
up? 
i. What do you do with that feeling? How do you move forward? 
ii. How often does this happen? 
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E. Future of Work and AI in General and Emotions 
1. What do you see as the overarching goal of your work? 
a. For your organization? For consumers? For society? 
2. What sort of impact do you think AI is having on the world right now?  
3. What sort of impact do you think AI will have in the future? 
4. What emotions come up as you think about these topics? 
5. Do these emotions affect how you approach your work in any way? If so, how? 
a. For instance, does your sense of the future of AI affect how you approach the 
problems you’re trying to solve? Please explain. 
 
F. Closing 
1. Are there any other particularly salient memories that come to mind that you’d like to 
share? 
2. Is there anything else related to these topics that you’d like to mention?  
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Appendix II: Final Semi-Structured Interview Protocol 
 
A. Background/Basic Information [part of interview only if not yet obtained] 
1. What is your educational background?  
2. What is your professional background? 
3. How long have you been at [organization]? 
4. What is your role at [organization]?  
 
B. Daily Work Experiences, Motivations, and Problem Solving 
1. What initially led you to pursue work in AI/ML? 
2. What are your current projects? 
3. How do you decide which projects to pursue? 
4. [If not covered in 1 or 3] What motivates you or drives you in your work?  
a. [Prompt if needed] For instance, people might be motivated by understanding 
how things work, solving hard problems, exploring ideas, inventing new things, 
or building tools people can use, among other possibilities. What would you say 
are the main motivators for you? 
5. What are your typical day-to-day work experiences when developing a new algorithm?  
6. Think of a recent time when you had to work through a challenge with an AI that you are 
(or were) developing. What types of thoughts and emotions came up for you? 
a. What did you do with that (those) feeling(s)? How did you move forward? 
b. [Prompt if needed] Did you learn anything from this experience? If so, what did 
you learn? If not, why not? 
c. How often do you have experiences like these? If rarely, please describe the more 
typical challenges that come up, if any. 
7. Some interviewees have referenced the “black box” concept as applying to machine 
learning work. Does this ring true for you? If so, how? If not, why not? 
a. What are your views on whether machine learning models can be fully understood 
by humans?  
i. What leads you to think this way? Please describe any experiences that 
come to mind.  
 
C. Forecasting and Constraints 
1. As you’re doing your work, what sorts of possible applications or ultimate uses are you 
thinking about? What do you see your work building toward in the future? 
a. How do you see the relationship between humans and the technologies that you 
are creating? 
2. [If not covered in 1] Do you ever think of more downstream outcomes that might unfold? 
If so, what types of outcomes do you think about? If not, why not?  
a. [Prompt if needed] For instance, imagine that your creation is very successful and 
widely adopted. What effects do you think that will have?  
b. Please describe any experiences that made these factors salient to you, if any.  
c. [If negative outcomes discussed] What can be done about these issues, if 
anything? 
i. Does your work play a role in this process? If so, how? If not, why not? 
d. Have you always held this (these) view(s)? If so, why? If not, what changed? 
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3. How do these considerations affect you and your work, if at all? If they don’t, why not? 
a. [Prompt if needed] For instance, are you changing aspects of your work process 
or product based on these factors? If so, in what ways? If not, why not? 
b. [If negative outcomes discussed] Do you impose boundaries or constraints on any 
aspect of your work process based on these factors? If so, in what ways? If not, 
why not? 
4. [If constraints described for 3] Did a particular experience lead you to approach your 
work in this way? If so, please describe it.  
a. How did you feel about your work when you weren’t placing these sorts of 
boundaries on your work? 
b. How do you feel as a result of placing these sorts of boundaries on your work?  
5. Some interviewees describe having a sense of responsibility for the possible outcomes or 
downstream effects of their work. Does this ring true for you? If so, how? If not, why 
not? 
a. [If yes] Did a particular experience make these factors salient? If so, please 
describe it.  
 
D. Broader Future of AI 
1. How do you see the relationship between humans and AI? For example, do you think of 
AI as a friend, adversary, partner, tool that humans use, or something else? 
2. What do you see as the future of AI in general? 
a. How do you think society will be affected, if at all? 
3. Do you think that we should have any particular concerns about how AI might develop? 
If so, please describe them. If not, why not? 
4. If you envision a future in which AI reaches human-level intelligence or reasoning 
capabilities across diverse tasks, what emotions does that bring up for you? 
5. How easy or challenging do you find it to predict how AI might develop over the next 10, 
20, or 50 years?  
a. What leads you to think this way? Please describe any experiences that come to 
mind.  
b. [If relevant] When you think about the ambiguity or uncertainty involved in how 
AI might develop, what reactions or emotions come up? 
6. Do your views on how you think AI will develop affect you and your work in any way?  
a. [Prompt if needed] For instance, do you make decisions as you’re developing this 
technology based on these factors?  
b. Have you changed anything about your work based on these views? If so, how? If 
not, why not? 
7. [If not covered in 5] What do you think should be done about these issues, if anything?  
a. How do you see this relating to your own work, if at all? 
8. Have you always felt this way about the future of AI? If so, why? If not, what changed? 
9. What current or future applications of AI are most exciting to you? 
 
E. Closing 
1. Is there anything else that you think I should know – anything related to these topics that 
you’d like to mention?
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Appendix III: Data Table with Representative Quotations 
 
Note: For “A Common Starting Point,” “U” indicates that an informant exhibited unconstrained creativity. “H” indicates that an 
informant exhibited heedful creativity. 
 
 A Common Starting Point: “Noisy” Forecasting, Positive and Negative Outcomes, and Ambivalence 
“Noisy” 
Forecasting 
“These kinds of technologies can suddenly jump ahead much quicker than you may expect. So I still think it’s 
important to keep an eye out and see these AIs aren’t suddenly becoming much more intelligent than we 
anticipated in a short period of time.” [James - U] 
  
“Anyone you talk to, I’d say if they’re making claims about we’re approaching general human capability, in 
some sense, we’re just not anywhere close to that, I mean nowhere close. But at the same time, the current 
momentum and trajectory and velocity in the industry is just astonishing. And so in 50 years that could be 
completely different. In 50 years – you know, it’s actually a really short, amazingly small timescale. So we’re not 
there yet. Will we get there soon? Quite possibly.” [Jack - U] 
  
“Right now, the field is moving so quickly that even, you know, it’s hard to predict even in the next two years 
what technologies would emerge. …It’s hard to say. Ten years even seems so long. It’s hard to imagine what 
would be the state of the world in that sense.” [Noah - H] 
 
“Being able to estimate where research will get in 20 years is just, I mean, historically, it’s something that people 
try to do but never works.” [Charles - U] 
 
“Here, in my work, it’s very difficult to make this kind of [prediction] looking forward in technology because, as 
you may know, something may suddenly happen, and everything changes. Five years ago, deep learning was 
nothing, and now deep learning is everywhere. …Rodney Brooks said, ‘We’ll have limited self-driving cars in 20 
years.’ And Elon Musk tells you, ‘Next year we’re going to Tesla doing self-driving cars all around.’ [Laughing] 
So, it’s really, really, really, really, difficult.” [Jeremy - H] 
 
“I think a lot of the time when things happen, it’s only when we look back, we say, ‘Oh, it should have 
happened.’ But no one actually does a good job to predict the future. …We can foresee for maybe a couple of 
years, and what comes after that may be totally different from what we can foresee. …That uncertainty is in our 
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work. But the problems we are trying to solve is something we know; it’s just how we get there we don’t know.” 
[Eve - U] 
Forecasted 
Outcomes 
Positive: 
 
Driving Scientific Progress 
 
“I am part of that generation of AI 
researchers who gained perhaps 
initial inspiration as a child from the 
famous HAL in the film 2001. 
…And then of course as I started 
graduate study, PhD study, I 
encountered a lot of different kinds 
of ways into that part of computer 
science. I was particularly interested 
in evolution as a problem solver, 
really, but as a means to develop 
these intelligent systems. I have 
always been very interested in the 
idea of using inspiration from nature 
to try to find ways of engineering 
solutions to the problem of 
intelligence.” [Ellen - H] 
 
“The real question there is really for 
me about how complexity can be 
created out of almost nothing. That’s 
what really inspired me. So it’s like, 
my brain is a product of evolution, 
which is an unguided search process. 
…So that’s an open-ended process, 
it just keeps going, it keeps 
inventing things. It doesn’t converge 
Negative: 
 
Causing Direct Harm Through Dangerous Applications  
 
“In 2016, we were one of if not the state of the art. But just two years later 
- nowadays technology advances so fast, that the fake images generated 
by machines, by AIs, look just like real. And clearly, from my own line of 
work, this is very scary, because if it is not used by good people, you can 
do fake news, you can generate porn, and many negative things. So that is 
personally in my line of work, it’s scary.” [Bob - U]  
 
“It’s an efficient and effective technology for detecting things, capturing 
things and then, you know, like, creating things. …So, yeah, that … you 
have to be worried about. Because you have this kind of effective and 
efficient AI technology, we can make a better as in, like, you know, 
worse, kind of weapons or the things that can hurt a lot of people.” 
[Nathan - U] 
 
“The idea of weaponizing any kind of technology is of great concern. And 
the more that you can depersonalize doing bad stuff to other people, the 
easier it becomes.” [Ellen - H] 
 
“These debates and tradeoffs, people think about this in any line of work, 
but the fact is that in ML, the impact of a single algorithm can be so far 
reaching because it can be applied to influence the software that so many 
people use, that it does give it extra weight. Someone who’s debating 
whether to build a building for the government or not, it’s just one 
building, but if you debate whether to build an algorithm for the 
government or not, that algorithm could potentially be applied to 
hundreds of millions of people.” [Colton - H] 
 
 127 
to this endpoint and then it’s done. I 
think it may be that we need an 
open-ended process to actually 
produce something like a brain. 
Because we are a product of an 
open-ended process. So trying to 
understand how to produce open-
ended processes is important for the 
advancement of the field of AI and 
it’s something that we’re working 
on.” [Ryan - H] 
 
“Honestly, in the end, sure, I want to 
be good and do good stuff for the 
world, but honestly, I mean when we 
talk about motivations, I care more 
about inventing new interesting 
stuff. So what really pushes me is 
inventing new things. That’s what I 
see as a value in itself.” [Mark - U] 
 
“We also want to focus on the main 
scientific question. Our main goal is 
not to have it next year deployed in 
the environment. It’s to be able to 
find the right way of giving these 
kinds of capabilities to robots. ...But 
I will say, as a scientist, I care more 
about general capabilities than the 
specific application.” [Daniel - H] 
 
“It’s kind of fascinating, it’s one of 
the things that drew me to AI, was 
“I’m not 100% sure to what degree everyone having this technology will 
prevent it from being used in malicious ways. For example, one of the 
technologies that worries me at least a little bit is the ability of these 
neural networks to create fake images, fake videos. They’re starting to 
become increasingly realistic, so it becomes hard to tell them apart from 
reality.” [James - U] 
 
“They say, ‘Oh yeah, we have an airplane that crashed, a similar airplane 
that crashed, and we need to figure out the people who get out of the plane 
who survived and find them and be able to rescue them with a search and 
rescue team.’ So everything is kind of really civil security and 
everything... But just get the context and put that in, ‘We have an enemy 
plane that crashed, and we want to kill them, so can we just find them in 
the world and fire a gun?’” [Henry - H] 
 
Causing Direct Harm Through Malfunctioning Creations 
 
“There is I think a much more serious and much more concrete issue of 
bias in machine learning systems which we definitely need to overcome. 
…I think machine learning needs to have much more input from social 
science and areas that have actually thought about these issues a lot more 
deeply than machine learning has. I think there is work to be done in 
aligning the incentives of machines with humans more closely. I don’t 
exactly know how that would work, but I think there are interesting 
research directions there too. So there are some concrete needs now.” 
[Sean - U] 
 
“Sometimes the consequence is just the company lost some money, but 
sometimes it could be really serious. So in this case, the people will try to 
develop some very correct system. They prefer to lose some detection, but 
once they detect something or try to predict something, it will be really 
very accurate. Just like self-driving. In this kind of application, it’s not 
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all these sorts of analogies between 
creating an algorithm that searches, 
and then ourselves, human inventors 
that are searching for algorithms. It’s 
kind of complicated and 
interesting.” [Adam - H] 
 
Improving People’s Everyday 
Lives 
 
“Everybody talks about, like, ‘Well 
is it the 4th or the 5th or the Nth 
industrial revolution?’ I’m like, 
‘Yeah, sure. Now we can replace 
some other class of labor with 
machines. Nice! People can do 
something else.’ If we can replace it 
with a machine, it probably wasn’t 
worth doing with a human in the 
first place. Of course, this is kind of 
self-justifying, but it’s also what I 
believe. …I don’t see any big reason 
to think it’s going to be that 
different.” [Mark - U] 
 
“If I had to decide to design society, 
it seems like you could use this stuff 
and it would make for a more free 
and – an environment where an 
individual can thrive more easily.” 
[Frank - H] 
 
just like a fraud detection system. There are very important 
consequences.” [Marie - H] 
 
“[T]he systems are not always right. So clearly there is a chance you 
would hit the wrong target [with autonomous weapons], and that would be 
very bad for humankind. That’s the first thing I worry about.” [Bob - U] 
 
“If you’re a black man, you’ve just been rejected a loan, you think this is 
very weird, ‘My credit score is good, okay, why?’ And they say, ‘Well, 
you know, the ML algorithm figured that out.’ Well what’s probably 
happened is there’s bias in the data, because this is sourced from the past 
where they were a lot more racist. And what’s happened is that it’s 
learned the pattern of if you’re black, we’re not going to give you a loan. 
And they don’t even know that’s in their model. But if you actually go in 
and explain it, you’re able to be a lot more fair, you can remove that 
whole process from the model. It’s really important for me that we’re able 
to understand what our models are doing.” [Gary - H] 
 
“What’s the goal? What is the end game? Do you want to make it so you 
don’t have to do anything? Because if that’s the end game, you’re going 
to fail. In the end, you’re going to end up with a system that you don’t 
understand, that makes predictions or recommendations based on data that 
you haven’t read and don’t have the same level of competence for as the 
network does, and now it’s going to be making decisions based on that 
data, and you have no way to check it.” [Barry - H] 
 
Causing Indirect Harm Through Job Displacement 
 
“I think the big threat is probably just the lack of employment moving 
forward, more of the economic effects of what happens when labor isn’t 
valuable anymore, because AI can basically do anything. …It’s big 
threat.” [Jim - U] 
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“I think people always talk about 
this job displacement. However, if 
you look back in history there are 
three industrial revolutions. And 
each time – for example there is the 
machines replace workers. And each 
time you would think that there are 
people being replaced by something, 
so there is job loss. I think this is 
only true for a shorter period of 
time. There is always jobs in terms 
of jobs after that when you look at 
the history of what happened. People 
actually will be freed from some of 
the highly laborious and be able to 
do some more interesting work, and 
the work is actually more diverse.” 
[Eve - U] 
 
“If we can teach a machine 
something, it would make it 
intelligent, so that our life would be 
easy, so that it can work for us.” 
[George - H] 
 
“I want it to be useful to people. I 
want it to augment our own 
capabilities, and I want to find a way 
to make it improve our lives and 
make our lives more fulfilling.” 
[Harry - H] 
“I mean you could definitely use it as a tool, but it’s not going to be that 
far off from anything that has to do with writing computer programs or 
doing anything technical like writing code - it seems like that thing could 
all be done by these algorithms very well and very efficiently. How 
engineers will use it as a tool or whether or not it will just end up 
replacing a lot of engineers is just up in the air. I think that’s kind of the 
thing that’s coming down the pipe probably.” [Barry - H] 
 
“What I’m I guess more worried about and think more of on the short 
term is how AI is going to replace a lot of jobs. So you have the self-
driving cars remove all truck drivers and taxi drivers, get them out of a 
job. Systems are also very good at searching and analyzing, well, human 
language as well, they’re getting better at analyzing human language, 
which can actually hurt people like lawyers, which is almost surprising, as 
those I guess highly educated positions have never really before been 
threatened by technology. But maybe now they are.” [James - U] 
 
“Trucks will become more autonomous in a way, and that’s way more 
worrying for [the truck drivers], because we don’t know what we are 
going to do with them.” [Joe - H] 
 
“There’s the broader future, which is somewhat scary. You know, AI, if 
it’s sufficiently intelligent, will be smarter than any individual human. 
That’s both fascinating but scary. …If an AI has been trained with the 
experience of a hundred thousand people, you know, it could unparalleled 
in terms of what it can create. I think it’s already shown that it can not 
only do many tasks better than humans can, whether that be something 
skilled like a medical diagnosis, it can do those very well. But then people 
are like, ‘Oh, it can’t really touch the creative side.’ Well, recent AIs have 
shown it can make its own pictures, sort of like a dream. It just draws 
from a bunch of different scenes and splices them together.” [Justin - U] 
Ambivalence “[AI tools] model you so well that they can target you, they can predict exactly what is going on in your life. This 
is really, really scary, especially when it’s not being used in good hands. …Actually, the technology helps 
 130 
people, on one hand. On the other hand, it actually hurts people. And clearly, I don’t see a decreasing trend of 
this, it’s only increasing. …[If we achieve human-level AGI,] machines can replace humans, because if they can 
perform reasoning, that is one of the highest forms of intelligence. …And at that point, it becomes very mixed 
feelings, either you feel very thrilled about what you can do with AIs to solve all of these tasks, but also you are 
worried about what is the meaning of being a human at that point, because the machine is better than you.” [Bob -
U] 
 
“For deep learning, it’s completely exciting, and it’s completely scary... I mean, the concern with general AI is 
going to be tough. So, what I say is that, yes it’s exciting and frightening at the same time.” [Zack - H] 
 
“The AI is going to change everything. Alexa, at home, Siri, in the phone. So, really, it’s the future. On the one 
hand, it was that part that, that’s, okay I’m going to get into the future. Now, I’m going to learn it and I’m going 
to learn it early. And on the other hand, I’m also a little bit afraid.” [Jeremy - H] 
 
“I think it should be positive. But there are always negative risks, right? …So if you have machines who 
understand the world better and in a similar way to how humans understand the world, that means that the 
machines can also understand humans better, which could be good because then they understand how humans 
look at the world. But that also might be that then they could do things to humans in the world or something like 
that.” [Sean - U] 
 
“Like the nuclear bomb, nuclear power has good things in terms of providing power. We discovered this first by 
science, and then the application was to make something that is terrible in some ways. This principle exists in 
nature. We just need to face it and try maybe to organize our society to deal with that better, but I don’t think that 
AI is such a threat.” [Henry - H] 
 
 Unconstrained Creativity  
(N = 18) 
Heedful Creativity with Self-Imposed Constraints  
(N = 46) 
Relating to 
Outcomes 
Creating Psychological Distance from Negative 
Outcomes By: 
 
1. Anchoring on Present Moment (N = 13) 
 
Commitment Manifested in: 
 
Excitement about Positive Outcomes 
 
“I’ll always think a lot about theory and algorithm 
development, but the most exciting things for me I 
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A. Technical Details of Work and Role Boundaries (N 
= 10) 
 
“I don’t think it comes up on the day to day. I have a job, 
and my job is to make this thing work. So I’m so absorbed 
in the details that I’m not really thinking of the big picture. 
But then there’s those times when you’re just having some 
beers with friends, and you just get to philosophizing, then 
I like to think about these things, and they come up. But at 
the same time, if I’m reading stuff online, I’m less apt to 
read some pop-sci article about what some person thinks 
about the future of AI than I am to read about some very 
technical ML paper that introduces a new idea. Like that’s 
what I’m just more interested in from a practical 
standpoint, is the details.” [Justin] 
 
“Generally, I think it’s actually not a technology or 
scientific question. But it’s more about how the society 
and the policy makers can come to a consensus and then 
come up with a, you know, reasonable set of regulations. 
… So, all we really need to do is to ensure that there are 
going to be a group of people who are sufficiently fluent 
about this technology and then are not easily swayed by 
these new ideas – you know, papers uploaded on ArXiv 
every single day – or the people who have absolutely no 
idea. So, that’s the group of people that we need to 
educate or, you know, to prepare. Not like, you know, the, 
‘Oh, okay, let’s ask the scientists to wait a bit until we 
figure out this kind of thing, because we are not making 
progress that fast anyway.’” [Nathan] 
 
“I mostly work with how neural network learns, and if 
they learn badly, then I just retrain another one. The risk 
think are on the applied side. To take these systems 
that work pretty well and use them to transform our 
understanding of what’s happening in the world 
around us, or to make a positive impact with pretty 
small amounts of effort going into it, I think is really 
special and really exciting.” [Doug] 
 
“There are really good potential use cases, like the 
drug discovery thing. It’s like ,what are the important 
problems for the human race? Take out profits, which 
is like, being at a company, you cannot say that, 
right? But I don’t care about how much money we’re 
going to make off of this, do it because it’s the thing 
that the human race should be doing that we have to 
do, or we go extinct. Like, there’s all kinds of 
problems that we should be exploring as fast as 
possible. How fast can we get machine learning to 
help us cure cancer? How fast can we get it to 
eliminate poverty? Or fix global warming? Like, 
there’s so many problems to solve in the world. …I 
think, like, medical stuff is the best example because 
that could eliminate so much suffering in the world.” 
[Barry] 
 
“I think it may be that we need an open-ended process 
to actually produce something like a brain. …I’m 
pretty confident we can get really good, open-ended 
process within about 30 years. And that would be 
amazing. You could imagine artificial systems 
proliferating with cool, interesting stuff forever, like 
on the level of what earth can do, this would be an 
amazing step that would be very interesting and 
maybe help us get to AI.” [Ryan] 
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associated with my work is reasonably small. So maybe 
that’s why I don’t worry about it.” [Jenny] 
 
“I mean maybe it’s true AI could have this negative effect 
[if segments of workforce are displaced]. Maybe it’s just 
something that we will have to take into consideration. It’s 
not something you can stop. It’s something you can just 
think about and maybe… You know, many things in our 
common life, in our world, are modeled after a very old 
idea of life and work, like the 8-hours-per-day work in an 
office or a factory. Those were just decided arbitrarily 
during the industrial revolution. And maybe they make no 
sense now. So maybe that should just be changed 
according to the new progress. But that’s for someone else 
to decide. … So I trust the scientific community – this is 
what I always do – to come up with good guidelines and 
solutions for this.” [Nick] 
 
“I feel that most of our technology is probably going to be 
highly protected, at least if we’re smart about it. We’re 
going to keep building systems for particular purposes.” 
[James] 
 
B. And/or Limitations of Current Technology (N = 6) 
 
“We made this huge program, and we had these numbers 
that seemed to go higher than humans, but on the other 
side, you had these large weaknesses, these weird things 
about the system that I guess we don’t understand that 
well. These systems are not as powerful as maybe they 
seem at first glance. So I guess that is why I think this is 
going to be more gradual. …I feel it’s not going to be this 
sudden, suddenly AI takes off and takes over the world. I 
 
“Something that many people in the field might say is 
that they want to make a better world. A lot of people 
say that. But that’s too vague for me. So, but it’s in 
part true. …I want to build things that benefit 
ourselves, that will improve the lives of people.” 
[Jeremy] 
 
“We often think about unreal spaces and solving 
problems in those unreal spaces. Or transforming 
problems into unreal spaces, which we search. …And 
then you slowly realize, hang on a sec, this thing is 
actually really quite good, and look, it can solve a lot 
of these standard data sets, and if it can solve them, 
maybe it can solve some real stuff, and, oh yeah, it 
really can. So personally I’m a bit more practical and 
I like to think about the impact and I like to think 
about what problems we can solve.” [John] 
 
And Concretizing Negative Outcomes 
 
“Humans seem to be able to deal with edge cases. 
You know it’s like if a horse flew out of the back of a 
car in front of you or something, you would still 
probably try to get out of the way. But a computer 
might not know what it’s looking at and just do 
something crazy. It could do something crazy.” 
[Ryan] 
 
“Someone… asked [a journalist] a question about 
automation of labor, and she said, ‘The reason we’re 
here now is not because automation is coming. 
Automation has been affecting people’s jobs for the 
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think there’s a fairly gradual process with a lot of I guess 
intermediate episodes where we can get some additional 
experience with what AGI might look like and get more 
informed of how we need to deal with it.” [James] 
 
“Humans are actually very, very good at being flexible 
and recognizing rules and figuring out when things apply 
and when they don’t. And to the extent that we can codify 
computers to mimic that, it’s kind of getting better. But 
that’s a lot of the reason why I think AGI is so ridiculous, 
it’s because it is very much on this level of, we train 
something to predict, you know, 60 numbers. And this is a 
far way out from that, and even knowing what AGI looks 
like, cause we’re still not at that point. …Generally the 
further we’ve dug in this space, the more complicated 
things have become.” [Charles] 
 
“Silicon Valley’s very exciting. It’s a very exciting place 
and a very optimistic place. And I think I tend to be a little 
bit more on the I guess skeptical side. I’m aware that like 
as someone who’s down in the weeds, I might be overly 
obsessed with seeing all the difficulties along the way 
instead of thinking about the broad picture.” [Andrew] 
 
“We often make a lot of backwards steps without realizing 
it and, you know, after about several years, we realize that 
oh, actually, we took a wrong path, you know. We’ve got 
to go back for something. So, to me, it’s actually not that 
fast. I don’t worry about it. We are making a lot of 
mistakes anyway in science. So we are not moving that 
fast.” [Nathan] 
 
2. And/or Emphasizing Positive Outcomes (N = 8) 
last century. The reason we’re here now is because 
you’re worried it’s going to affect people like you and 
me.’ …And it really struck home with me. And I 
began to think more – you know there’s a tendency in 
my field, and I’m particularly guilty of it, to sort of 
trivialize what we do. So, you know, I work in video 
games, and I don’t even work in particularly 
applicable research in video games. So for a long 
time, I just thought, ‘It doesn’t really matter what I 
do; no one’s ever going to pay attention. Some 
science journalists will write about it; that’ll be nice.’ 
It began to be clear to me that … actually my work 
was not as trivial as I thought, and there were real 
applications.” [Alan] 
 
“The first, which I think might be a problem, it’s 
about employment. I always think about it with the 
truck drivers. …AI will help for economic reasons. 
…But then the question is, what people are going to 
do, who will lose their job, what are they going to do? 
And I think everyone has heard of that, from let’s say, 
AI experts. And I have to say I think it’s a real issue. I 
have no actual answer to this issue. …And we have to 
think about it. …I’m developing, for example, if you 
take the truck example, sometimes when I work on 
this connected truck project, I think, yeah, one day, 
maybe these people won’t have jobs anymore.” [Joe] 
 
“If it’s a classification problem, people are going to 
try to use this stuff for it at some point in the near 
future. There’s some classification problems where 
it’s, like, not necessarily a good thing that it gets used, 
because it removes the human element. Like, how I 
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“I think it’s really promising, the things – I mean again it’s 
scientists who try to use deep learning for different tasks. 
And so that’s one thing that I think will be progressing 
quite fast in the future. And also … that the networks can 
do everything that we cannot for them by themselves – so 
they can adjust their internal architecture and settings by 
themselves, I think this will also be a promising thing in 
the future.” [Andrea] 
 
“We want to create things that does things we’re not good 
at so we can concentrate on what we’re good at. So I’m 
quite optimistic.” [Mark] 
 
“I’m pretty sure we will have more cobots – so robots 
which are working together with the human – for long 
time. And the robots which will replace the human are 
already there. And for me, for sure, we will have more and 
more and more robots, etc.” [Brad] 
 
“When this new generation of kids grow up, it’s more 
embedded to their daily life right now. So almost everyone 
grows up with technology. They almost aren’t aware of it, 
because it is embedded into their life. So I think – I guess 
it will co-evolve with the technology as we use it more 
and more.  …I still believe I’ve learned AI will be very 
important in our daily lives for a lot of small tasks.” [Eve] 
 
“Garry Kasparov has this thing that he said where like a 
computer can always beat a human, but like a human and 
a computer working together will always trounce a single 
computer. And I think it’s a really interesting idea to find 
ways to use AI alongside humans to empower them. So 
got into that question is, my sister is a social worker, 
and they have this recommendation system … and it 
spits out a list, a rank-ordered list of who the 
homeless people are that need housing the fastest, 
who the highest-priority people should be. And 
they’re required to use that list as the list, to fill it in 
that order, put the person in number 1 in the first 
house that’s available, put person number 2 in the 
second house that’s available. Those are kind of other 
scary uses for it because it removes responsibility 
from the person that has to make that decision and 
instead of going out and interviewing the person, 
they’re just looking online at text.” [Barry] 
 
“…You have other rogue elements I guess you could 
say, like not in the US Military but somewhere else, 
some other military, like a non-country type of entity, 
where they would just want the AI, they don’t care 
about whether they’re ethical or not. And so those 
kind of things, that’s a little tricky there. So I guess 
the hope is that you are not going to pass the 
technology around in the public if there is such a 
technology. Like, if there’s technology that could 
wage war, like, automatic – autonomously, that’s just 
not the kind of tech that should be open-sourced on 
the internet. But then, you know, it’s not completely 
clear when you have created such a technology. Like, 
if you just have generic AI that’s super intelligent, if 
that’s in the public domain, people could use it for 
whatever they want. And how do we prevent it from 
being abused?” [Ryan] 
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for instance instead of the AI writing songs, there’s so 
many ways that an AI could help you write a song. And it 
sort of combines human creativity and AI creativity and I 
think that could be amazing.” [Jacob] 
“So when you no longer have to send soldiers into 
harm’s way to wage warfare, when you can just send 
your robots or whatever, or just use your robotic 
drones to make the air strikes, whatever the particular 
technology might be, that makes it that much easier to 
do completely horrible things to each other. So that is 
certainly a big concern from my standpoint.” [Ellen] 
Amplification 
Dynamics 
Amplification of Positive Orientation 
 
“We will have automatic art generation. …And this is 
very interesting that in the future we will have a new form 
of art that will be generated by AI, and that puts a lot of 
good creation and interesting creation on the table. I’m 
very enthusiastic about this. I think it’s very good, because 
this is new tools for artists. So of course individuals will 
use these tools to make art without artists, but I mean that 
wouldn’t be very interesting art. …What is very 
interesting is this new electronic music, new art, and all 
the questions that are raised, I think artists will have new 
challenges, and can use these tools as new content to 
explore. And I find this very nice. Inspiring.” [Dennis] 
 
“If a recommendation is for something you may not 
already know and how to find that information and make 
it available to each person, I think that one part excites me 
a lot. And the other thing is if you think about the current 
recommendation results in your daily life, it’s still far 
from satisfactory. There is still a lot of room for 
improvement. So that’s another thing that excites me.” 
[Eve] 
 
“I’ve stayed optimistic. I think technological development 
is always a good thing. It has bad effects, it generates bad 
Temporary Strengthening of Negative 
Orientation: Urgency and Responsibility for 
Negative Outcomes 
 
“If we’re just responsible with it, and it comes down 
to the question… These language models are gonna 
pick up on a lot of bias that we write, now, as 
humans. …If your entire existence and all you were 
and everything you ever knew was only the things 
written on the Internet, maybe if you think about it 
like that, yeah, maybe these models are gonna be 
amplifying a lot of the things that we already don’t 
like about certain things we do. And that’s a real 
problem. …Like, how do we, just as responsibly, how 
do we be careful with the data?” [Harry] 
 
“There are things that we can do, but maybe we 
should just avoid. I’m just trying to think about it in 
games specifically. There are a lot of people who 
think that games are a good way to teach, like, 
political ideas or solve political problems, which I’m 
very skeptical and worried about and avoid generally. 
…I’m slightly worried about what the implications of 
that might be. …It’s responsibility; a big part of it is. 
…If I also can talk about social issues and labor 
issues and political issues, then I think … dispels the 
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outcomes just as anything – if any movement is not 
handled well, it would make some aspects of society 
horrible, but I think in general it’s moving towards the 
right trend.” [Jenny] 
 
“When it comes to for example content generation, when 
it comes to job replacement, I’ve thinking in terms of, 
well, we have this amazing method that I’ve been helping 
with for generating income for example. Will this make 
designers unemployed? ‘No’ is my answer to this. 
…Actually, we’re creating new tools.” [Mark] 
 
Constraints Unnecessary or Counterproductive 
 
“[My concern about dangerous applications is] more in the 
back of my mind. If I was letting it influence things, I 
might not be working in this field. I might be afraid of it 
and not trying to push it. And in fact I’ve got a project in 
the works to make these generative models much better 
than they are currently today. So I’ll probably be part of 
the problem.” [Jack] 
 
“Maybe at some point we come to a point where there 
simply isn’t enough work for people to do. So at that point 
basically becoming unemployed is just – it’s not the fault 
of the person being unemployed, it’s just like, there’s not 
anything to do because all the work has been taken over 
by AI. And I think something like that will require a huge 
shift in society in general. …And if that starts happening 
to more and more people, and no more jobs get created, 
we will need to adapt as a society. …It’s something in the 
back of my mind, but it doesn’t affect my day to day 
idea that you can just do AI without engaging with 
these things. There is no such thing as an AI account 
with just tweets about AI. You have to do all the other 
stuff because that is the other half of AI.” [Alan] 
 
“The things that people tend to think of immediately 
is what are the potential harmful effects of AI on 
humans, but they never want to go look at the other 
side of it, which is what are our responsibilities to 
those AIs? I mean if these are really human-level 
intelligence, what does that actually mean? Is it 
ethical, if they get difficult, to just pull the plug? Is 
that ethical? …Well if they have human-level 
intelligence, are they just machines anymore? So this 
is very much the part of the ethical thinking where I 
am right now. This is what has really driven me away 
from the notion of human-level intelligence. Or for 
that matter even cat- or dog-level intelligence. It’s… 
where are those lines? …Just the whole idea of 
creating these AGIs, but keeping them limited, 
keeping them under control, is like, so it’s ethical to 
create a whole race of slaves? That’s an okay thing? I 
don’t know. I don’t feel particularly good about that. 
…We do get very tied up in the ‘Can we do this?’ and 
don’t take the time to step back and reflect on whether 
we should. Because they’re too very different 
questions. AI is an area where if we fail to examine 
the ethical foundations and ramifications of what we 
are doing, I think we fail not only at our own peril, 
but at everyone’s peril. They really are critical 
questions.” [Ellen] 
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work, at least not at this point. …It’s even hard to see 
what should be done, if anything.” [James] 
 
“And most of these far-out [news] pieces, honestly from 
my perspective, I think they’re kind of ridiculous. I 
understand that Elon Musk obviously gains a lot from 
convincing people that [AGI] is a realistic thing to be 
worried about. But, it’s not my view on it at all.” [Charles] 
 
“I really believe that trying not to develop something is 
useless. Because I mean, that’s really, I’m not that unique, 
my capabilities are not that much greater than anyone 
else’s. If I don’t do it, others will.” [Mark] 
 
“How we do research is to come up with methods for 
generating something new and also to come up with a way 
to distinguish whether the things that are generated are 
things are good or bad and so on. Essentially, this kind of 
research or science is almost always, it’s a double-sided 
sword, right? So, you know, but the thing is that it’s 
impossible to make a sword to have only one side – that is 
sharp on one side and dull on the other side. It’ll always 
be, say, sharp on both sides. So, generally, I think it’s 
actually not a technology or scientific question. …The 
applications and how these things are going to be used are 
really, really, fun to think about, obviously. But the things 
that, how these are going to be used is, in my opinion, is 
not really up to me or to my imagination.” [Nathan] 
“There’s a lot of danger in placing too much faith in 
imperfect algorithms that are, that… I think it’s one 
thing to recognize that they’re always imperfect. The 
bad thing is when you assume – when you act on it 
knowing that it’s imperfect and that affects a lot of 
people’s lives. So bad credit scores and ratings 
systems, there’s all sorts of problems with encoding 
biases into ML - encoding the biases that people 
already have in an automated way rather than trying 
to fix those biases or make the automated version 
better than the humans. There’s a good book on that, 
“Weapons of Mass Destruction,” that details a lot of 
ways that algorithms can be misused to ruin people’s 
lives. And that’s a huge danger. If we place too much 
faith in single algorithms that are too centralized, then 
it’s not a great thing for society.” [Colton] 
 
“I guess [I have] maybe a sense of responsibility I 
think. So I am in a position where maybe I know all 
these beautiful techniques and I know at least for 
some of them that they could be used to do wonderful 
things. And so maybe I should push a bit more in that 
direction to help.” [Dylan] 
 
 
 
 
Categories and Types of Self-Imposed Constraints 
 138 
Positive 
Moral 
Valence 
(N = 25) 
Constraining Project Choice 
 
“As an AI researcher, my own thinking about what our goals actually should be has actually changed quite a lot in the 
past 10 or 15 years, since I really started studying the field in depth. I guess as a field, for AI, the holy grail, if you will, 
is human-level intelligence. …As a researcher, I deeply question whether that should be our goal at all at this point. And 
that’s purely from my own ethical standpoint. The way I think about it is, we can’t treat other human beings particularly 
well and equitably yet across the board as a species, so how would we treat an intelligence that was completely 
different? So I’m really questioning that whole idea of human-level intelligence, if that’s really what we should be after 
at this point.” [Ellen] 
 
“The way I typically choose the applied field is looking for something that I think is a positive contribution to society. 
…Certainly the choices to pick applied projects that are inherently and undoubtedly good for society, I hope that I 
would have done already, but certainly having a constant reminder of the pros-cons list I think definitely helps nudge 
things in that direction.” [Doug] 
 
“I don’t want to make AI that is, for instance, AI related to military stuff. So, the thing is that, I signed … a letter that 
many or most of the main AI researchers signed, I also signed, about asking to limit the use of the AI in the meantime.” 
[Jeremy]  
 
“Leaving (eliminating) the human factor from the war is very dangerous. So I don’t think it’s a good idea to develop 
autonomous weapons. On the short run it might be a win, but on the long run it’s certainly a big issue on how humanity 
might develop.” [Christian] 
 
“[A colleague and I] were talking about AI that would be able to play games and give feedback on them. And she said, 
‘You know, if an AI played a game about grief or trauma, any kind of feedback it gives on it is kind of going to be 
weird.’ So there are a lot of issues about, are there just hard limits to what AI can do? Is it – even in our best case with 
all of these considerations and being as understanding as we are trying to be, are there actually things that society will 
never want AI to do? And I think about that question a lot. Or are there things that AI should never do; that’s another 
thing. There are things that we can do, but maybe we should just avoid. I’m just trying to think about it in games 
specifically.” [Alan] 
Control 
(N = 21) 
Constraining Functionality (N = 18) 
 
Requiring Full Understanding (N = 6) 
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“[We’re working on] deciding which is the right action 
to take in this case of extreme danger or extreme rare 
occasions. You’re doing something in which a machine 
has to select killing one or killing the other one. …In the 
next months, I guess, [we’ll be] at the point where we’re 
going to insert this knowledge into the model.” [Jeremy] 
 
“There’s kind of this lab-experiment environment, where 
I just go and I spend some time just trying to make the 
model as good as possible, and I don’t think about those 
things. And then, there’s this compartmentalized time, 
where we step back, and we say, ‘Okay. Now that this 
model’s really good at the task we want’ – so, let’s say, 
language generation, ‘Now, how do we almost make 
sure that it doesn’t generate things we wouldn’t want it 
to generate?” [Harry] 
 
“I think a human can also react. It’s not just AI who has 
action on this. So a compromise could be, if we are not 
sure, we will ask some human to do the operation, to 
take action. …I think it is very important for people to 
have the possibility of being involved in the AI system. 
Even in some kind of use case, it is not so natural, but I 
think in nearly every AI application, humans can be 
involved. For example, in fraud detection system, the 
system will give back fraudulent score, ranking. But the 
system will not do any decision. It could be still the 
human who does the decision and takes into account the 
feedback given by the detection system. But the final 
decision will be given by the human. So still I think it is 
important to make sure or to make possible that if we 
want the operation involving of the people, we should 
give the possibility. I think for the moment, there are no 
“One short-term, proximal sort of thing is, can we just get 
more insight into what our current agents are actually doing, 
what they’re learning? So it’s kind of like a safety issue, but 
it could be a basic scientific issue as well. …It’s a recent 
sort of neglected area of research.” [Adam] 
 
“I’m primarily focused on making machine learning models 
interpretable in different ways. So a lot of the time when 
you’re developing an ML model, you’re kind of just looking 
at the accuracy or certain statistics about it which are 
informing you in some way of how good the model is. And 
that’s sort of how you develop your – what works and what 
doesn’t. ‘Okay so the number went up that I know means 
this, that means that the model’s good.’ But that can lead to 
a lot of problems. So my work’s basically about making the 
internals of the model more clear and kind of – instead of 
there being 20 million weights or 20,000 weights, each of 
them associated with a number which has some importance, 
there would be you know clear concepts, and then those 
concepts would be increasing or decreasing in a certain 
value. …So and basically filling in the middle step which 
explains what the model is doing. …I’d say I don’t fully 
understand everything that I create. Because I guess with 
linear models, so these are models that you know you can 
see every single step of what they do and you can see how 
they’ve done it, so it’s like a decision tree for what I was 
saying before… That’s quite easy to understand. I can see 
directly the process it’s taken to get that output. But any 
other model, where it’s just input – don’t understand the 
middle bit where the model works it out – output, I’m 
always in a state of, ‘I know this, maybe this concept, which 
is a little abstract, and maybe I know my data quite well, I 
know what kind of data it is, I know how it’s represented, 
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applications which can achieve full precision, 100% 
accuracy [without humans].” [Marie] 
 
“We believe that the human in the loop is a more perfect 
system than the machine – at this point, right? Maybe in 
the future where AI evolves, and you have general AI 
that is very powerful, then you could have that. But I 
think there will be a lot of time before that happens, 
because people I think want to still be involved and 
double check. There’s a trust issue.” [Evan] 
 
“Personally, I do think that you have to strike a balance. 
…Because of its dual-use nature, there are a lot of bad 
uses for AI technology. So, I actually wrote some papers 
about robustness of neural networks, for instance, and 
how you can try to safeguard yourself against sort of 
adversarial attacks. And I think in general it is an area 
that we’re very cognizant about, and I think that’s 
extremely important that we understand the 
controllability of the models that we develop, and how 
we might control or put [safeguards].” [Caleb] 
and I know my outputs – how my outputs were labeled, kind 
of what they are, but this whole middle bit, I don’t 
understand almost anything about what it’s really doing.’ Or 
at least it feels that way.” [Gary] 
 
“So we actually try and be really honest about [Game 
Design AI]’s weaknesses and the system’s shortcomings, 
and we’re very open with its process. Like, I literally show 
people how it plays games; you can just watch it. And the 
intention there is for people to realize that actually it’s not 
intelligent in the way they think it is and then have an 
appreciation for the ways that it is intelligent.” [Alan] 
 
“There’s a lot of issues right now with machine learning 
being a black box up and down the expertise chain. Like, 
Google doesn't know what's going on in some of their AI. 
Every big AI company is trying to create tools to help them 
figure out what the heck is going on. …AI doesn’t have to 
be a black box. Some of the machine learning stuff, at the 
moment where our technology is, is a black box because we 
haven’t figured out good ways to look at it yet. Nothing is 
hidden. You can always look at all the ways. …So it’s not a 
black box, it’s an open book.” [Joy] 
 
“A lot of this work into interpretability and explainability, 
most of the time, when you force a bottleneck in the model 
somewhere, where it has to do something like this, the 
overall performance of the actual task tends to get worse. 
But, in this case, we found that it actually improved. So, the 
way that we did it had some benefits to saying, ‘Hey, guys, 
everybody else in the community, guys and gals, if you 
want explainability and interpretability, maybe there’s a 
way forward, without losing on performance,’ which is what 
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lots of people care about. And that’s kind of the first goal 
that a lot of people think about. And we were showing, 
‘Hey, there’s a way that we can kind of put something in the 
model where it kind of looks like we’re seeing what it’s 
thinking, a little bit.’” [Harry] 
Quality  
(N = 23) 
Constraining Input (N = 10) 
 
“We need to be careful about what sort of 
data we provide to AI, how biased the data is 
with regards to gender, to culture, to race, to 
all these sort of biases that we tend to – 
unfortunately, we tend to use daily, as 
humans. So, we tend to actually not overlook 
these biases, but when we provide it to AI, 
AI’s nothing more than sophisticated 
statistical system, especially machine 
learning, the machine-learning aspect of it. 
Sophisticated statistical learning system that 
will learn from the data you provide. So, if we 
provide garbage, AI will learn how to behave 
in a garbage way. So, we need to be careful 
about that.” [Steven] 
 
“It’s much more important to understand the 
type of data they have or could get – these 
two things are much more important than 
which specific machine learning technology 
or AI we are going to… I mean once we have 
the data and are confident …[that] the data 
actually representative and so on … it’s 
something we’re very aware of.” [Nelson] 
 
Constraining Own 
Reactions (N = 6) 
 
“When you’re making a 
prediction, and the 
prediction turns out to be 
true, it’s very important 
that still you could say 
there are hidden 
information, and you have 
to doubt everything you 
said and did and do it 
again, to really be sure that 
it’s true. And, even with 
that, be cautious about 
this… Do not be over-
enthusiastic.” [Zack] 
  
“I think we should be a lot 
scared by black boxes that 
we think are intelligent. 
It’s very dangerous, 
because we want to project 
something about this being 
intelligent, whereas most 
of the case it’s not. And if 
we assume it’s a black box 
that’s as intelligent as a 
Constraining Release Process (N = 10) 
 
 “…We should keep our heads and 
remember, okay, we still have to do 
testing, we still have to do certification, 
we have to do retraining, we have to look 
at all the implications. You know, we 
know how to do this stuff. …We have a 
lot of safety procedures, some of which 
may seem tedious and boring to the 
general public, but actually they’re there 
for a good reason, because they do keep 
us alive. And therefore if we’re inventing 
new technologies, which will affect our 
safety, whether we call them AI or not, 
then hand-in-hand with that, we have to 
say, okay, what sort of testing? What sort 
of safety certification should we be 
having? How do we guarantee that we 
can actually rely on these technologies 
enough to use them? And it’s easy to pick 
on the self-driving cars, because they 
make the headlines. But there are 
unfortunately very readily available 
examples where people have believed the 
hype, and they’re sitting behind the 
steering wheel reading a book, and their 
vehicle has unfortunately been proven not 
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“These systems act on knowledge. I can think 
of scenarios where, you know, if they do get 
access to knowledge that's either sensitive or 
get some high level insight that could be very 
dangerous to have, then these kind of 
technologies can either be – if they’re 
concentrated in one place, that can result in, 
you know, differences between nations and 
the world or things like that.” [Noah] 
 
“At one point, our team was working on this 
model that would predict jobs. You will see 
recommendations for jobs and so on. So at 
one point, there’s an issue with diversity. We 
said, ‘Look, we have these features that are 
potentially discriminatory, or people might 
find them objectionable.’ So that was quite 
emotional. Should we have age as a feature? 
Should we have gender? Things like that. 
That elicited a lot of strong emotions from 
people – it’s quite personal. These concerns 
were addressed, and we took steps trying to 
make sure that our models are as unbiased as 
they can be. There’s always going to be bias, 
but we’re trying to make sure that there’s not 
something that people could object to.” 
[Greg] 
 
“So one problem you can have in these very 
class-imbalanced situations, where it’s much, 
much more common that you don’t have 
cancer than you do have cancer, is that the 
model will default to predicting the most 
human, I’ll assume a few 
things that will be 
completely wrong, and that 
will be very dangerous. So 
we start putting these kinds 
of black boxes 
everywhere. And they are 
all biased, they all have 
bugs, they all have issues. 
And they are much less 
smart than we think. And 
that’s one thing that will 
be very dangerous in the 
future, is when we start 
relying on these things 
without having an 
understanding of what 
they’re actually doing.” 
[Daniel] 
 
“…It kind of scares me 
because of the implicit 
trust that gets put into 
these. …We’re only 
starting to understand the 
negative impacts they 
could have with that 
implicit trust in them.” 
[Kevin] 
to be safe enough and has got itself into 
trouble through whatever environment 
wasn’t anticipated, and the person who 
should’ve been a driver but in fact was a 
passenger goes and gets themselves 
killed. We don’t want that kind of 
situation.” [John] 
 
“It’s become more and more… I don’t get 
results and then send them to my 
supervisor. I get results, and then I 
double-check, and then I triple-check, and 
I make sure that all of it clicks together 
the right way. And then I do a proper 
debugging process, so I have a bunch of 
tests that work. I know that I expect a 
certain result, and I expect them to 
behave a certain way. So that, given an 
input, I know that if that works, then 
maybe my model has a higher chance of 
working. So it’s just an iterative process 
of finding the problem and then solving it 
in some way and testing it in many 
different ways so that I’m sure this is the 
right thing.” [Gary] 
 
“When you train a machine learning 
model, …we decide whether or not we’re 
going to release this machine learning 
model to production. There’s this process 
of evaluating what’s good enough. So is 
this model of sufficient quality to release 
into the wild? And this is particularly 
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common class, so in other words the model 
can achieve a very good error rate simply by 
saying ‘You don’t have cancer.’ Although 
this might be optimal for optimizing the error 
metric you’ve defined, it’s definitely not 
optimal from a human point of view. So you 
may want to change the input data you 
provide to the model or change the way the 
model works, such that it produces results 
that optimize for a different metric, or are 
closer to what you’d want for future 
predictions. So there are kind of these failure 
modes that you kind of have to avoid, that 
aren’t immediately obvious, I guess. What 
I’m trying to get at is, you need to very 
careful about which error metrics you’re 
optimizing for, so there’s a translation task 
there that happens between user and 
machine.” [Richard] 
 
“There’s always a question coming up, ‘Well, 
what are the biases in the data you’re using? 
Like, how do we identify those?  How could 
you remove those?’ …How do we almost 
make sure that it doesn’t… amplify bias that 
is kind of found in data that we collect from 
the wild?” [Harry] 
important for tasks that are very 
subjective – so tasks for which there is 
not necessarily a correct answer, or the 
correctness of an answer is a bit more 
unclear.” [Richard] 
 
“Things are slowly progressing. What I’m 
doing now, basically I’m piloting the 
studies on the young people that are 
available in our group. So what we are 
trying now, we are trying to apply our AI 
techniques on the people over here. And 
then I think when it’s ready, or when we 
are confident enough, if we can get some 
data of the elderly people, then we can 
also apply on them. So I think it’s better 
to pilot things on ourselves first.” 
[George] 
 
“So as people will still go very slowly, at 
the same time we can have more time to 
better develop the applications. Also this 
will give more time for government and 
actors to propose more regularization, to 
make sure that AI systems will be very 
secure, will be very performant.” [Marie] 
 
“I’ve been involved in some testing of 
technology that have been involved in 
European Space Agency and Mars Rover, 
right? Ok, when you’ve sent it, you’ve 
sent it [laughing], right? You then should 
spend more time and use a lot of 
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resources ensuring it’s more correct. But 
it’s still not going to be perfect.” [Nelson] 
 
 
 
Unconstrained Creativity  
(N = 18) 
Heedful Creativity with Self-Imposed Constraints 
(N = 46) 
Engagement 
in Creative 
Process 
Engagement Facilitated by Positive 
Orientation Remaining Amplified 
 
“A lot of this uncertainty is a core part of 
why I like this space. There’s maybe some 
reasons to that, and maybe part of it is kind 
of fun. …When you jump in at the deep end 
of the pool, it’s really not so hard. So it’s a 
really nice place to play in.” [Jack] 
 
“Some of them are just beautiful. So 
algorithms help solve problems faster. 
…They seem like art, like really beautiful to 
me. And intriguing in a way you have no idea 
how they were formed in the beginning from 
some normal people’s mind. …We now are 
doing [our work] in a way of, ‘We don’t 
know how it works, let’s just test different 
things and see how it responds.’ But that’s 
how most natural science is done, so I don’t 
see a big problem there.” [Jenny] 
 
“When there’s no science behind it, so you 
do not know what the outcome will be, then 
it could be good or bad surprise. …With deep 
learning it’s more like a surprise. Which I 
think can be good and bad, but I like to see 
Engagement Facilitated by Positive Orientation Strengthening 
 
“I’d say I’m positively surprised almost every time I look at the 
explanations that we’re able to get from a model, or at least when 
they do well. If I’m looking at an interpretation of a model, and it 
says some interesting way of looking at how to get a genre of a 
movie or a sentiment of something, then I’m surprised. I’d say, ‘Oh 
wow, the model has learned something really interesting, which is 
enjoyable to read.’ I suppose the times I’ve been positively surprised 
are when I’ve actually looked at how the model is doing something, 
and it’s doing it really well in a new and interesting way that I 
hadn’t thought about before.” [Gary] 
 
“Gosh, what are the feelings you get when you do that? For me 
there’s definitely some of that compulsion, just, like, the need to see 
what’s next. Sort of almost like … Advent calendars or anything 
where there’s a surprise as to what comes next that keeps you 
hooked. …And I find a lot of the fun of it is curating what I’m 
putting into my things, like grammars. So I know what’s in my 
generator, but then it’s kind of an interesting automated 
juxtaposition reflected back at you when you when you see stuff 
that’s generated. …If you put two things together, you get 
something bigger out of that. It’s kind of the emergent magic of a lot 
of, at least my work, where there’s a lot of juxtapositions.” [Joy] 
 
“I think it also is, like, really fun to see what the algorithm will say 
and the mistakes it makes. Not even thinking, ‘Oh why is it making 
those mistakes?’ But …I think a lot of people will attribute a 
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the good part, it can be interesting, 
challenging, promising.” [Andrea] 
 
“I think that’s actually one of the most fun 
things about doing research in AI, is the 
black box nature – that sometimes you get 
solutions that, yeah, you didn’t expect. What 
are those?” [James] 
 
“It’s like a playful science experiment, and 
you record your observations as you might be 
like kind of studying new phenomenon or a 
new creature, not really knowing how exactly 
it works.” [Christopher] 
 
“Just to understand intelligence, what is 
consciousness? Is it possible to create 
artificial consciousness? …And finally, the 
last motivation is to have fun, simply because 
this is very fun, to implement machine 
learning algorithms to work on robots. This is 
like playing with big toys.” [Dennis] 
personality, or some level of like, ‘Oh that’s kind of funny that it 
would do that,’ and we’re talking about it less like an algorithm, 
more like a creation that we’re thinking about. So there’s some life 
to it, and that’s why I’ve always kind of liked machine learning.” 
[Christopher] 
 
“When you’re actually producing sentences or producing images 
that look life-like, and you’re kind of digging into the imagination, 
quote-unquote, of a machine learning model, that I think has a huge 
emotional reaction. … That’s what starts to feel like magic, that’s 
what starts to feel like creativity – having a model produce 
something perhaps no other human has said before but just sounds 
right and feels human. …It’s quite honestly mind-blowing to me that 
you can kind of define a very simple set of rules and hit go and 
watch as an algorithm picks up on patterns that you wouldn’t 
necessarily see yourself.” [Richard] 
 
“Working through ML problems and working with AI algorithms is 
exciting and interesting also, outside of these moments of frustration 
and joy. That’s why I like to work with this, because it gives you 
lots of excitement along the way… I guess the whole process, from 
like learning about a new idea – hearing and being inspired by other 
people’s work and their techniques in ML, to coming up with your 
own ideas and own hypotheses and testing those out and analyzing. 
It’s a creative analysis to try to understand models that you build. So 
I guess the whole work process, from learning new stuff to creating 
ideas and to analyzing and interpreting results.” [Kenneth] 
 
“The deeper the abstractions you can learn, is kind of how I frame it 
in my own head at least, the cooler it is, roughly. I think deep 
learning is really, really fascinating. I think the more unsupervised 
the process for kind of like getting a structure of a model, the more 
interesting of an AI primitive you’re working with. And I believe 
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that on a pretty base level. I just find the deeper ones cooler. …It 
was just like, kind of wonder at the coolness of the thing.” [Frank] 
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